Responsibility in the International Climate Regime:
Examining German Motivations in Burden Sharing

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In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Arts.

Environmental Studies Program

Spring 2016

Abstract

This paper seeks to identify norms and notions of responsibility within the international climate regime and how they relate to burden sharing. Burden sharing has been a part of the climate change regime since the 1997 Kyoto protocol, which coincided with the EU Burden Sharing Agreement. This agreement allocated significant burden to EU member states so, through historical analysis, I examined German motivations for taking on the burden that it did. Germany's rich culture, recent past, and its role as an economic powerhouse within the EU have all shaped its path to becoming a leader on climate change, and thus to agreeing to the BSA. I find that all of these factors contributed to a widespread acceptance of environmental policy. Therefore, the BSA was a logical next step and an obligation for Germany. While German environmental history is certainly unique to Germany, a feeling of responsibility to society transcends borders and exists outside of Germany as well. This indicates that other states may be willing to adopt a burden sharing system outside of the European Union. However, this moral imperative to 'solve' climate change still dances along cultural divides and brings up questions of responsibility to society.

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Acknowledgements

I would like to express my gratitude to my thesis advisor, Jim Proctor who has been a consistent mentor to me through my environmental studies career. Through this thesis process he pushed me to think more critically at every turn and assisted me in creating a thesis that I am proud of. Endless thanks to my thesis committee, Jessica Kleiss, Kyle Lascurettes, and Jim Proctor, who gave me hours of their time and attention this semester and helped me produce high quality work. I would also like to express my appreciation for my environmental studies peers, who continually supported each other through this year-long process despite having their own theses to write.

A special thanks to my mom, Seana Davidson, who provided endless support through this process and continues to support me through my life.

"A unified Europe must remain open to the world. Our responsibility in the world has increased. Willy Brandt, the senior president of this Bundestag, said it at the opening of this legislative period of this legislative period in Berlin. I quote him: *Germany would make itself guilty if it were to forget the global concerns*, that is, hunger in the world, migration caused by poverty, and destruction of the environment, because of its own concerns." [my emphasis]

-Chancellor Helmut Kohl to the Bundestag, the national parliament of Germany, January 30, 1991

Chapter I

Fairness in the International Climate Regime: An Introduction

A value system is a cultural construction by humans that "specifies norms, duties, and obligations; it assigns blame, praise, and responsibility; and it provides an account of what is valuable and what is not" (Jamieson 1992). Values are more objective than individual preferences and are generally implicit and hard to observe. Just as well, they tend to govern human behavior. This means that the value that a culture assigns to their nonhuman landscapes and spaces will govern their behavior towards those spaces. This paper explores how norms and feelings of responsibility govern how we approach climate policy. Is a feeling of responsibility, either to society, future generations, or to our surroundings themselves, necessary for addressing fairness within the international climate change regime? Is it necessary for a sustained commitment to combating climate change? These are the bigger questions this paper addresses by means of examining the EU Burden Sharing Agreement. This agreement redistributed an overall emissions target in order to address fairness and inequities between member states. Germany played a key role in pushing the EU's international commitment to climate change as a pioneer of environmental policy. By examining Germany's environmental movement and weaving a historical narrative as well as analyzing speeches and political rhetoric, I found that aspects of German culture, strong post-materialist ideals, and a distinct feeling of responsibility to the world and future generations were all driving factors in Germany's leadership. While Germany's history is unique to Germany, aspects of German motivations in burden sharing are generalizable and imply that the burden sharing agreement could be exported to other parts of the world.

The Ethics of Climate Change

Climate change, as an "environmental"[1] issue, is particularly interesting because it confuses our moral compass arguably more so than other issues. With climate change, there is no point-source on which to blame the pollution because we are all contributors. Polluters and the pollution therefore traverse our delineated boundaries, making climate change a distinctly global issue. Moreover, the negative effects of climate change are gradual and hard to clearly tie to our actions (Jamieson 1992) despite that we know anthropogenic activities are a primary cause. Thus, the ever-present moral argument of changing our ways for the sake of a future that we do not envision on a daily basis is difficult to maintain. Besides a moral dilemma on an individual level, climate change presents a system-level moral dilemma because it puts into question what is "fair" when employing the use of fossil fuels and facilitating the emission of greenhouse gasses. Countries that have been historically responsible for emitting greenhouse gasses and who currently contribute the most to atmospheric climate change -- primarily developed countries -- will actually not feel the effects of climate change to the same extent as the developing world. Developing countries are more vulnerable to climate change effects such as extreme weather, sea level rise, and agricultural productivity loss (Center for Global Development 2016). Thus, the countries that have contributed to climate change the most will have little motivation to enact international environmental agreements. It is also very difficult to justify requiring less developed nations to develop sustainably -- by which I mean limiting fossil fuel use -- by investing in and creating the infrastructure for renewable energy when that is presently a more difficult and costly pathway for achieving industrialization. Thus, taking responsibility for historical emissions is a common argument by developing countries, which puts the entire climate change problem and the responsibility to 'solve' it on developed countries. Naturally, this creates rifts and push back from either side.

Finding a way to allocate responsibility will be key to addressing inequalities inherent in climate change and moving towards addressing climate change itself. This paper explores a burden sharing system that was created to do just that: allocate emissions based on both efficiency and equity, meaning that some parties that have the capability to will take on more burden. This alleviates inequalities by not requiring that all parties be responsible for a similar burden. However, this system -- and any global system of this sort -- requires that parties voluntarily accept those burdens. This inherently brings up

[1] Because "environment" has a multiplicity of meanings and implications, I will be using the legal definition of the word "environment" for the instances when I mention the environmental movement, environmental degradation and protection, and environmental policy or legislation. Environmental law refers to the body of legislation "covering air pollution, water pollution, hazardous waste, the wilderness, and endangered wildlife" protecting the "environment" defined as "natural resources, wildlife, landscape, and amenities" (Environmental Law 2016).

another issue that plagues globalization and our value systems -- how much responsibility do we owe people of other nations? In the 1972 Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, principle 1 states that humans "ha[ve] the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being, and he bears a solemn responsibility to protect and improve the environment for present and future generations" (Caney 2005, 164). This not only invokes that we should be dealing with climate change because it is an obligation to provide everyone their basic human rights but it also makes us *responsible* for our actions in our human and nonhuman environs. So, it is important to address how we move forward on the issue of climate change through all of these deep-seated divides surrounding responsibility. In this way, fairness and responsibility are linked. Finding a solution for allocating emissions that feels *fair* to and facilitates cooperation between all involved parties is a necessary, albeit challenging, step to addressing climate change. With finding a fair solution comes the added challenge of assigning responsibility for actions that contribute to climate change.

Framing question: How can the international community move towards rectifying ethical divides and ideas of fairness within the international climate change regime?

Sharing the Burden of Climate: A Brief History

"In 2015 COP21, also known as the 2015 Paris Climate Conference, will, for the first time in over 20 years of UN negotiations, aim to achieve a legally binding and universal agreement on climate, with the aim of keeping global warming below 2°C" (COP 2015). The Paris Agreement, a "historic" agreement that came into fruition after an arduous negotiation process, is significant for many reasons. For one, it marked the first time since the founding of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) that every member state of the UNFCCC unanimously signed on to a legally binding agreement. It marked the end of a slew of unsuccessful climate negotiations that had been ongoing since the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. As another departure from the Kyoto system, the Paris Agreement requires all nations to submit Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs), which ensure that countries pledge what they feel they can with the intention of revising them over time to be more stringent. This attempts to resolve conflicts between developed and developing countries while also making sure that countries feel that what they contribute is fair and equitable. In fact, this issue of fairness in international climate policies has been ongoing since the early 1990s when the international community first recognized that climate change was caused by anthropogenic activities.

The Rio Earth Summit in 1992, which established the UNFCCC, repeatedly stressed that an equitable and fair distribution of burden between countries was imperative to solving climate change. This is illustrated in Article 3.2 of the UNFCCC, which states that consideration should be given to "the specific needs and special circumstances" of member states (Ringius et al. 1997, 13). Additionally, the UNFCCC invokes several equity principles and general norms of fairness. For example, Article 3.1 states: "The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities" as well as "the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof" (Ringius et al. 1997, 13; United Nations 1992, 9). This notion that different states will take on different levels of burden when combating climate change was addressed in Kyoto, even though the Protocol only bound Annex I countries to emissions targets and exempted less developed nations. The Kyoto Protocol allowed Iceland to increase its emissions by only 10% above 1990 levels, Australia: +8%, Norway: +1%, while Japan had to decrease its emissions by 6%, the U.S.: -7%, and the EU: - 8% below 1990 levels (Ringius et al 1997, 16). This system would create a net decrease in emissions of 5% below 1990 levels for the first commitment period, 2008-2012 (Christoff 2006, 833). However, it largely failed to do so because the U.S. did not end up ratifying the treaty due to the exemption of China and India who were also major emitters at the time (Howes 2009, 411).

The exemption of developing nations from the Kyoto Protocol exemplifies one of the most divisive issues in climate change negotiations. The divide between developing and developed nations has always created a rift that has, until recently, prevented the creation of a post-Kyoto binding international treaty under the UNFCCC. As mentioned above, this is because of equity. One of the main arguments made by industrializing countries is that developing and emergent nations have the right to utilize fossil fuels to industrialize, and that wealthier, industrialized countries should take responsibility for the impact they have already made on global climate (Stern 2008, 67). Moreover, not only is it more expensive for developing countries to develop without carbon-intensive fuels, but they will likely feel the negative effects of climate change more severely than their industrialized counterparts. This is due to geographic location as well as their capability to address the resulting damage from climate change (Aldy et al. 2010). Recently this divide has been lessened; countries like China have agreed to cap its emissions for the first time and all member states submitted INDCs for the COP21. Both the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement illustrate attempts to create an international burden sharing regime and address the ongoing issue of equity in climate negotiations.

There are several ways the UNFCCC has sought to address fairness and climate change such as in adaptation, climate finance, the use of technology, and mitigation. One of the ways they have addressed

climate finance is through the Green Climate Fund, which was established at COP16. This fund allows developed countries to provide financial assistance to developing countries under the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities" (UNFCCC 2016). The Green Climate Fund was addressed in Paris and several countries made pledges however, no concrete commitments were decided upon (Thwaites et al. 2015). However, developed nations did commit to continue mobilizing at least $100 billion a year for climate finance by 2020 and until 2025. The Technology Mechanism within the UNFCCC works to promote the transfer of less carbon-intensive technologies to developing countries. The Technology Mechanism exists in three branches: the COP supplies governance, the Technology Executive Committee deals with policy, and the Climate Technology Center and Network oversees implementation. This program works to "support developing countries' efforts to address both policy and implementation aspects of climate technology development and transfer" (UNFCCC 2016). These are just a few of the examples of ways the UNFCCC is attempting to deal with fairness and climate. However, mitigation efforts are still very much voluntary and dealt with on a national scale. Mitigation efforts on an international scale exist in so far as Paris exists. International solutions dealing with both mitigation and fairness remain elusive except within the European Union (EU).

The EU, the same year that Kyoto was agreed upon, started discussing the distribution of mitigation targets between its own member states. This distribution would be based on both equity and efficiency, and was agreed upon in the Burden Sharing Agreement (BSA), ratified in 2002. Essentially, burden sharing allows for some countries to emit more within the EU, while other countries shoulder more of the burden so that the total reduction averages out to 8% below 1990 levels, in line with the Kyoto target, but not every state is committed to 8% themselves. This gives each state their own mitigation target under EU law as well as Kyoto. The agreement was based on the "Bubble" agreement in Article 4 of the Kyoto Protocol, which the EU advocated for, and states that groups of countries can accept a collective emissions target and internally redistribute it (Aidt and Greiner 2002, 2). Under the BSA, states with lower marginal costs of reducing emissions will receive a greater burden than states with higher marginal costs. This makes burden sharing more efficient than proportional reduction to meet commitments because it accounts for the large differences in marginal reduction costs between states (Barker et al. 2001). Efficiency is subsequently impacted by issues of equity and fairness: factors such as emissions per capita, emissions per unit of GDP, and GDP per capita (Barker et al. 2001, 246). In this system, countries like Germany and Denmark had a -21% emissions target for the 2008-2012 period while Portugal and Greece had a +27% emissions cap. Why should some countries be allocated a net increase in emissions at all? Is that not redundant when they would otherwise, outside of a Kyoto framework, be increasing their emissions anyway? Not at all. This system required those countries only

increase emissions by the allocated amount, not more, thereby preventing a free-for-all with greenhouse gasses. This system, coupled with the EU's Emission Trading Scheme, allowed the EU to meet its Kyoto target. The burden sharing system deals with both mitigation and issues of fairness and it is the only successfully implemented, legally-binding system of burden sharing related to climate change.

Burden sharing is not a new concept. It is evident with NATO and the idea of collective security as well as within other international organizations. That said, the fact that it has been successful within the environmental policy sphere is significant. Within financial and military organizations, successful burden sharing is unsurprising because economics and security are high-priority issues for nation-states. Environmental policy is usually secondary, which is why states are generally unwilling to accept more burden when it could lead to a relative disadvantage economically; environmental degradation and economic prosperity are commonly linked, and vise versa. While this illustrates a disregard for the economic costs of inaction on issues like climate change, state reluctance is unsurprising. Therefore, the fact that the EU was able to meet its Kyoto commitments through a system (i.e. the BSA) that creates relative "winners and losers" (Barker et al. 2001, 246) has significant implications for issues of equity in international climate negotiations because of the UNFCCC's emphasis on "common but differentiated responsibilities." Therefore, how the EU was able to successfully agree upon these differentiated responsibilities is something that should be examined. Why were these states in Europe willing to forgo relative gains and accept a greater burden within the EU BSA? Can this system be exported to an international scale? This paper will seek to address these questions by examining one of the EU's most influential players, Germany, and its motivations for enacting some of the most ambitious emissions reductions in Europe.

Focus question: What factors contributed to Germany's acceptance of the EU BSA?

The next chapter of this paper looks at whether the EU was able to implement the BSA due to its singularity as a regional organization as pertaining to the principle of solidarity, one of the founding principles of the EU. The principle of solidarity directly relates to the idea of common but differentiated responsibilities, and therefore directly relates to burden sharing. This section explores EU "uniqueness" and what that would mean for a burden sharing system. The third chapter examines the factors that led to Germany's acceptance of the BSA. I found that German culture, its sense of responsibility due to recent post-war history, and the establishment of post-materialist ideals all contributed to a growing acceptance of environmental policy in German society and influenced its role as a leader. Through the 1990s, Germany was becoming more and more a leader on climate policy, therefore making burden sharing a

logical next step and more of the norm. The fourth chapter follows up with this idea, examining how unique these feelings of German obligation really are and if they are necessary to the BSA. I found that Germany responsibility can be extended outside of Germany's borders, which means that if responsibility to society is a necessary sentiment for burden sharing, this sentiment can be exported along with a burden sharing regime. Furthermore, many of Germany's motivations as they pertain to its culture and history are distinctly German, however, when distilled, these aspects can be generalized. Surprisingly, I find that solidarity with other nations is not unique to Germany or possibly even Europe, which bodes well for the exportability of the BSA. This section further discusses the feasibility of an international burden sharing regime. The last chapter concludes, reiterating that this paper attempts to break down what is unique and what is generalizable in the context of Germany and the EU BSA, thereby adding to the broader literature surrounding burden sharing as a concept and a mechanism for addressing fairness in the climate regime.

Chapter II

Precaution, Solidarity, and EU "Uniqueness"

Is the EU BSA unique to Europe? Is the reason that attempts to create an international burden sharing regime have been thus far unsuccessful because there is something the EU 'has' that is not generalizable? This chapter will explore why the EU is viewed as 'unique' -- namely because of its unprecedented level of political and economic integration. It will also explain the precautionary principle as an important facet of EU environmental policy and the principle of solidarity as a key founding principle of the EU that relates to burden sharing. As a system designed to address fairness and mitigation in the climate regime, burden sharing should not be overlooked as a "unique" system to the EU. I find that while the precautionary principle is generalizable, the principle of solidarity is thus far unique to the EU, which could impact the exportability of the burden sharing system.

The Principle of Precaution

The European Union has been heralded as a "unique" regional organization because it has achieved a level of integration that no other regional organization can claim. By high level of integration I mean that they have integrated the member state's economies into a single economy with a single currency, free trade, and even free movement of labor for EU nationals. However, this integration does not extend to economic integration alone. The EU is also politically integrated with the ability to pass and regulate EU-wide policies. This is evident in the strict regulations relating to health, safety, and the environment the EU has been imposing since the 1990s. These regulations have been accompanied by a foreign policy that emphasizes the exportation of these regulations. In this way, the EU can exercise increased legitimacy for its regulations and increase its soft power when new countries undertake equally stringent regulations. Of course, the desire to export its regulations are also in consideration of its economic interests; it wants to remain competitive on an international platform. "Government regulation of business represents one of the EU's most successful "exports"" (Vogel 2012, 14).

Salient in many of the EU environmental policies and regulations since the 1970s, the "precautionary principle" has been the justification for environmental protection, not EU objective-interests (i.e. economic gain). In fact, due to European pressure, the precautionary principle was even included in the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development under Principle 15, which is

another example of an EU environmental policy "export." The precautionary principle implies that the government should act and impose regulations on, say, pollutants even if -- maybe especially if -- there is no scientific consensus on the negative effects of the pollutant. The precautionary principle inherently makes the goal of the policy normative, again implying a uniqueness to EU policy. The principle was introduced to Europe after it was introduced in Germany as *Vorsorgeprinzip*, which is "commonly interpreted as "precaution" or "foresight," though the term also implies "good husbandry" or "best practice"" (Vogel 2012, 266). The use of the precautionary principle in German law prompted other European states, and then the EU, to adopt similar principles. The principle is included in the Treaty of the European Union under Title XVI: Environment, which states:

> "Community policy on the environment shall aim at a high level of protection taking into account the diversity of situations in the various regions of the Community. It shall be based on the precautionary principle and on the principles that preventive action should be taken, that environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at source and that the polluter should pay. Environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and implementation of other Community policies." (Treaty of the EU 1992)

We can see in this statement the commitment to the "diversity" of member states' "situations," tying the precautionary principle to burden sharing. The mention that the polluter should pay as well as the incorporation of environmental protection into other Community policies, further strengthens the argument that environmental protection is an obligation and national interests matter less than responsibility, despite the emphasis on the exportation of regulations.

The use of the precautionary principle could be argued to be unique to the EU however, the risk-aversion that the principle promotes is not inherently European. During the 1970s, the US also implemented risk-averse policies and environmental policies were relatively bipartisan. Yet since the 1990s, the US has moved away from risk-averse policies to risk-acceptant policies. To explain this difference, it has been argued that Europeans are simply more risk-averse than Americans. Although it has also been argued that Europeans adopted the precautionary principle because they have a deeply rooted cultural value for the non-human and "natural" spaces and resources, and its protection for future generations (Vogel 2012). In his book, *The Politics of Precaution,* David Vogel examines the differences in policy choices between the EU and the US and why they have diverged over time. Towards the end of his book, he posits that cultural theory may have some explanation as to why the EU has adopted risk-averse environmental policies while the US has not. Here he quotes Andrew Jordan's "The Precautionary Principle in the European Union," pg. 155:

> "Those who regard the environment as inherently robust and capable of withstanding sustained human impact (i.e. individualists) will tend to be less precautionary than those who regard human impact on nature as unpredictable and potentially calamitous (i.e. egalitarian-hierarchists)...the EU now conforms more to the predictions of the latter" (Vogel 212, 277).

This implies that Germany, too, conforms to more egalitarian-hierarchical notions of nature. However, the adoption of the precautionary principle into international organizations like the UN again implies that risk-aversion is not inherently European. This indicates that under the right conditions, the principle of precaution works in many different milieu and is not necessarily unique to EU environmental and climate policy, which bodes well for the exportability of the BSA.

The Principle of Solidarity

During the 1990s, with the creation of the UNFCCC and subsequent annual conventions, the EU was extremely active in pushing for international agreements on climate change. The EU quickly realized that to fight climate change, the rest of the world would need to adopt similar policies. Within international climate negotiations, the EU pursued, and has continued to pursue, a strategy of exercising its soft power by providing "directional leadership" with the use of diplomacy and argumentation (Oberthür et al 2008, 36). This was because stringent climate policies in Europe were already beginning to be set into motion and the EU wanted to remain economically competitive. However, even though the EU emphasized that it was imperative that there was international support for climate policy, when the US did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol the EU "maintained and even strengthened its commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions" (Vogel 2012, 29). This again indicates that there is some obligation inherent in the EU's commitment. Moreover, businesses in the EU have been more willing to accept the greenhouse gas regulations that have been imposed and this has not been for strictly economic reasons. Therefore, although the EU attempts to export their regulations to remain economically competitive, the EU ultimately forgoes many objective-interests when enacting climate and other environmental policies. This implies that the EU has other motivations besides interest-based reasons that would encourage it to take a leading role on international climate action. Represented by the EU's founding principles, there seems to be a moral component to EU climate policies.

One of the founding principles of the EU, present in both the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Title IV) and the Treaty of the EU (Article 2), is the principle of solidarity. The principle of solidarity implores member states to stand with one another in various ways. Article 2 of the Treaty of the EU states that the Community will,

> "Promote throughout the Community a harmonious and balanced development of economic activities, sustainable and non-inflationary growth respecting the environment, a high degree of convergence of economic performance, a high level of employment and of social protection, the raising of the standard of living and quality of life, and economic and social cohesion and solidarity among Member States."

The solidarity clause in the founding documents emphasizes social justice as well as financial security, so in this way the principle of solidarity could be interpreted as a mechanism to protect EU economic interests. However, the inclusion of environmental protection into the solidarity clause implies more than simply a functional use for the clause (Bogdandy 2006, 33). The Charter of Fundamental Rights, Title IV: Solidarity, states under Article 37: Environmental Protection, "A high level of environmental protection and the improvement of the quality of the environment must be integrated into the policies of the Union and ensured in accordance with the principle of sustainable development." This Article links solidarity among member states to environmental protection under EU law. The principle of solidarity is also closely linked to the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities present in international environmental policies (de Larragan 2010, 178). Therefore, the principle of solidarity can be linked to the notion of burden sharing, which emulates common but differentiated responsibilities. Like integration, solidarity among member states is unique to the EU. This could, but does not necessarily, imply that to implement burden sharing countries must feel solidarity with partner states.

When the EU BSA was being negotiated, it was first presented to the Council of the European Union ("the Council") by the European Commission in March 1997 so that member states could agree on their individual targets. While the BSA and the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) are often discussed interchangeably, they were different resolutions and were negotiated at different times although the ETS works to assist member states in meeting the targets of the BSA. The Council is different from other branches of the EU because it consists of government ministers from each of the member countries who represent their member states' interests in the EU government. At this time, EU member states agreed to an overall cut of 10% below 1990 levels. After the Kyoto Protocol was agreed upon, the agreement was renegotiated in the Spring of 1998 to instead meet the 8% reduction that was agreed upon in Kyoto (Aidt and Greiner 2002; Harris 2007). This second round of negotiations not only reduced the overall target but also significantly redistributed targets between member states (Aidt and Greiner 2002). The fact that ministers from member states had key roles in negotiating their nation's burden certainly hints that there are some feelings of obligation to other member states, which I will show in the next section is emulated in German rhetoric. Moreover, this implies that the governmental structures unique to the EU need not be necessary to an international BSA as this style of negotiation with representatives from each state would be the most likely scheme on an international scale, further supporting its exportability.

The principle of solidarity coupled with the EU's unique level of integration does indicate something inherently "special" about the EU. Additionally, because it was the only entity to employ a burden sharing policy for carbon emissions, this would imply that the BSA is also unique to the EU. However, as an important principle for burden sharing because it established a normative argument for

environmental protection, the principle of precaution is generalizable outside of the EU. To explore whether or not the BSA has the same "uniqueness" as the EU, I need to examine the motivations of a key member state to determine whether ideas of solidarity and responsibility were driving factors in accepting burden. It's clear that any burden sharing agreement would need candidates like Germany who are willing to decrease their emissions while others are allowed to increase their emissions by a specified amount. By understanding the factors that led to Germany's decision and leadership role, we can better understand how the BSA could be generalized or exported outside of the EU.

Chapter III

Germany's Moral Obligation to Combating Climate Change

Why Germany?

During the 1980s, three states stood out as having more pro-environmental policies than other member states: the Netherlands, Denmark, and Germany. Britain, France, and Italy during this time favored less stringent regulations than these three "environmental leaders" (Vogel 2012, 244). Although both the Netherlands and Denmark agreed to similarly ambitious targets relative to Germany's, as the biggest economy and emitter in the EU, Germany's reductions equalled 80% of the EU's overall reductions. While this seems impressive, Germany is also the biggest emitter and economic powerhouse within the EU so its commitment to a 21% reduction from 1990 levels under the BSA is proportional to its size, making it a fair commitment. In this way, Germany presents itself as a one of the guys, just another self-interested state. Thus, it's important to understand why the largest emitter and largest economy within the EU agreed to the BSA in order to understand the exportability of the agreement. Another regional or even international BSA would require the cooperation of these larger emitters and economic powerhouses, which then makes the puzzle less about the relative size of the burden and more about Germany's power position and leadership role within the EU. It is important to understand Germany's position not because the accepted an unreasonably large burden, but because Germany is one of the most influential countries in the EU and serves as a model for other equally influential countries. Yet, Germany does illustrate a unique case because it was a forerunner of the environmental movement in the 1980s and '90s within the EU and pushed for climate policy before many other states. Germany's role therefore has evolved to become not only a financial leader but also an environmental and diplomatic one as well.

To examine Germany's motivations within the burden sharing context, we must examine the historical context surrounding the progression to leadership. Then, by examining the rhetoric of German leaders from 1985-1997 we can better understand the extent to which norms and ideas of moral responsibility contributed to German environmental policy, namely agreeing to the Burden Sharing Agreement, in the 1980s and 1990s. I chose 1985 because it was a year prior to the Chernobyl nuclear accident in 1986, which had a profound effect on the environmental movement in Germany and 1997

because that was the year the BSA was proposed. Through the rhetoric, I found that moral responsibility to protect the environment for future generations as well as global solidarity became commonplace in German rhetoric, adding dimension to the leadership role Germany began to play in the EU. This rhetoric was absent from other environmental leaders like the Netherlands and Denmark. Postwar Germany facilitated an evolving German identity, which has influenced a moral obligation and notion of responsibility that permeated German political rhetoric. However, this sense of responsibility within society is not as apparent and German society, when compared to other countries, does not stand out in this regard indicating that responsibility was not the only driving factor for German leadership. I argue that Germany's sense of responsibility, thriving culture, and role as an economic powerhouse were all driving factors in Germany's emerging leadership in the climate regime, which individually cannot explain this emergence.

The German Context

Located in Central Europe, Germany is the most populated and wealthy country in the European Union. Its major ethnic group is German which makes up about 90% of the population. Germany's most abundant natural energy source is coal and even after meeting its Kyoto targets, Germany still produces more carbon emissions than any of the other EU member states (Eurostat 2015). While oil and coal (both hard coal and lignite) are the primary energy sources in Germany -- together they make up approximately 58% of Germany's energy profile -- the amount of renewables in the energy profile has increased from 4% to 12% since 1990. Additionally, coal use has decreased by about a third since 1990 (Jungjohann and Morris 2014). Despite this decrease, coals remains a profitable export in Germany as the world's appetite for coal has increased and its cost has decreased. In 2011, Germany's nuclear phaseout was re-introduced, with 8 nuclear plants closed immediately, which, along with high gas prices, has increased the use of coal in Germany slightly. Germany has attempted to make up for this nuclear phaseout by expanding the production of renewable energy, as is consistent with *Energiewende* (energy transition) which is its policy for transitioning to an energy portfolio that is promotes renewables and energy efficiency, and eventually the transition away from coal (EnergyPost 2015).

Energiewende is consistent with the the widespread acceptance and promotion of environmental values within German society, by which I mean the understanding of the necessity of environmental policies and societal actions that deal with energy efficiency and conservation, to name a couple. Since the 1970s, environmental protection and the promotion of policies in Germany has been on the public's mind. What started out as a movement of citizens initiatives and local environmental groups turned into

an institutionalization of the movement, where environmental policy and subsequent promotional rhetoric became commonplace in the political sphere. During the Cold War, Germany was one of the few countries in the world, like the Koreas, to be separated into two. The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) or West Germany was a thriving country while the German Democratic Republic (GDR) or East Germany's economy collapsed in 1989. During the 1990s, Germany underwent significant changes due to the economic costs of reunification, political merging of the two Germanys, and a reconciling with the severe ecological degradation present in East Germany. Despite this melting pot of issues, environmental protection was still emphasized, as illustrated in the "Treaty on the Creation of a Monetary, Economic, and Social Union between the FRG and GDR" which mentions having a "responsibility toward the environment" (Hamburg DPA 1990, 2). Even in the economic downturn in the 1990s, environmental protection was viewed as a necessity despite a shift in focus to policies that promoted economic success.

In Germany "political actors and social groups envision nature and imagine community through competing nationalist, regionalist, social-class, and other ideological lenses. In Germany, this process has resulted in environmental reform agendas that span the political spectrum from left to right. There is no ahistorical ecological consciousness that transcends human constructions of nature" (Lekan 2009, 263). With the widespread acceptance of an issue, there naturally becomes competing interests and differing opinions but the differing camps become more nuanced than, say, pro-environment vs.. pro-economy. The last sentence in Lekan's quote is reminiscent of the idea that there is no uniquely German affinity for environmental protection, Germans are simply incorporating a necessary part of society to fit with other societal interests. In the next section I discuss German culture and its proclivity for viewing landscapes as part of the German identity, which fits directly with the "human constructions of nature" Lekan presents. This illustrates that Germans view environmental protection as a facet of society, something to be shaped by the humans living in it, rather than a purely ecological issue. The next three sections discuss German culture and its propensity for preservation, Germany's recent history and how the postwar period shaped its national identity, and Germany's economic status and how all three factors contributed to Germany's capability to accept burden both economically as well as socially.

Affinity for the Oak

When discussing German motivations and the factors that led to the BSA, it's imperative that we understand how German culture has shaped its environmental movement. Royal Tinsley and David Woloshin (1974), in their article "Approaching German Culture: A Tentative Analysis," argue that German culture inherently creates environmental enthusiasts,

"As a component of the universal order, which is synonymous in some respects with nature, the individual must function as a part of nature. To this extent the German is a nature lover and born conservationist. Much of the German's love of nature and everything "natural" is undoubtedly the product of nineteenth-century romanticism, of the nature philosophy of Friedrich Wilhelm Schelling, and of Friedrich Schlegel's merging of God and nature into one entity. The idea of the "Golden Age," borrowed from Greek antiquity, when man and the gods lived in harmony with nature was popular throughout much of German history" (Tinsley and Woloshin 1974, 130).

The "merging of God and nature into one entity" is certainly emulated in statements made by Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) where he links the environment with Creation. In a CDU conference in 1994 Kohl states, "I would far prefer to use the word creation rather than environment because it contains far more in terms of our ethical responsibility" (Berlin N-TV 1994, 25). This implies that, just as religion is a natural creation of society, it is natural to be an "environmentalist" and "liv[e] in harmony with nature." Thomas Lekan, in his book "Imagining the Nation in Nature: Landscape Preservation and German Identity, 1885-1945," discusses how German idealism and reverence for nature has persisted since the Romantic period: "In Germany, the nineteenth century Romantic cult of nature had saturated the landscape with symbolic meanings, creating a sublime naturalism running through the poetry of Heinrich Heine, the philosophy of Gottfried Herder, the visual art of Caspar David Friedrich, and the music of Richard Wagner" (Lekan 2009, 1). He goes on to discuss British author Stephen Spender, who wrote that the German landscape was "shaped and thought of and thought into, rather than civilized" by which he meant the German landscape reflected a conscious effort to balance human priorities with "unspoiled nature" (Lekan 2009, 2). This evidences a common thread in German society to attempt to unify the needs of society with the preservation of the German landscape.

In German culture forests are viewed as a central part of their 'German' landscape and society, "The iconography of German nationalism, confirm[s] an identification with forests in general and the oak in particular -- traditionally associated with liberty, vitality, and permanence" (Goodbody 2002, 36). In this way, the preservation of the German landscape has historically been associated with the preservation of the German identity. Early, pre-World War II (WWII) preservationists, viewed protection less in an ecological sense and more as a necessity to protect a national identity present in its pure landscape. This indicates that environmentalism in Germany need not be tied to what we think of as the present day "environmental movement" and instead first existed as a desire to preserve national identity. These early German preservationists, who were active prior to WWII, succeeded in pushing the creation of many nature reserves throughout Germany but many of them ultimately went on to support Nazism, which promised to "return Germany to its roots in Blood and Soil" (Lekan 2009, 3). The post-WWII eco-movement that started gaining momentum in the 1970s did well to avoid "*Heimat* rhetoric that described the landscape as a reflection of national character" in order to disassociate themselves with

pro-Nazi preservationists and as an effort to "overcome the Nazi past by identifying themselves with a "European" community that transcended national borders" (Lekan 2009, 18). During the post-war period after economic rebuilding, the environmental movement largely discredited this expressly nationalistic view towards preservation. However, the above does suggests that environmentalism, although anthropocentric, had been present in Germany prior to WWII before its resurgence in the late 1960s. To transition away from nationalist views of the landscape, the movement emphasized that the landscape should be preserved in a balance with human society rather than kept "unspoiled." These priorities that were interwoven into the environmental movement of the 1970s onward appealed to Germans on a cultural level, which contributed to the movement's legitimacy.

Post-Materialism and the German 'Economic Miracle'

Tinsley and Woloshin (1974), in their attempt to explain German culture, argue that for Germans time is money, which makes them not only economically driven but very efficient. This is evident in many public speeches where the focus is on economic prosperity, but of course economic prosperity is a priority for all nations. The German 'time is money' mentality, however, is also especially apparent in Germany's commitment to decoupling environmental degradation from economic growth. This attempts to make sure that environmental protection can happen alongside economic growth, as both are deemed necessities. This brings up an important aspect of why Germany agreed to the BSA; Germany not only has the political will, but it also possesses the capability. It consistently has the highest nominal gross domestic product (NGDP) of any member state (see graph) and while it does not have the highest GDP per capita, it is among the highest (Eurostat 2016).



Source: Wilder 2012

After WWII, Germany underwent significant economic reconstruction, which resulted in what is referred to as an 'economic miracle' or a period of incredible economic prosperity for West Germany. After reunification, which by 2004 had incurred over a trillion euros in costs and counting, there were significant attempts to reshape East Germany's economy to match those of West Germany's. In many ways, however, East Germans during this time were not able to appreciate the same standard of living or social welfare that West Germany had prior to 1989 (Brockman 2006, 21). As a social welfare state, Germany provides, and is expected to provide, safety nets for its citizens. These would all contribute to an environment conducive to producing what Ronald Inglehart calls post-materialist ideals, such as environmentalism.

Ronald Inglehart's theory of Post-Materialism states that countries where citizens feel their basic material needs have been met will be more inclined to seek social change and adopt "post-materialist ideals." Some post-materialist ideals would include giving the people more of a say in their community and government decisions, freedom of speech, making urban and rural landscapes more beautiful, and moving to a society where ideas count more than money (Inglehart 1981, 884). Inglehart notes that economic growth has historically been regarded as self-evidently "good" however, the environmental movement calls this into question arguing that the economic benefits do not always outweigh the environmental costs (Inglehart 1981, 895). This is consistent with rhetoric in Germany that expresses an aim to rectify this phenomenon and decouple environmental degradation from economic growth. In a speech to the Bundestag in 1985, Chancellor Helmut Kohl said, "Economy and ecology must not be steered in a course of collision but must be reconciled together" (Cologne ARD Television Network 1985, J11). Here we can see two important aspects of German environmental policy: the protection for future generations and the unifying of economy and ecology, which are both sentiments echoed throughout the rhetoric. Moreover, A 2002 survey in Germany found that the majority of Germans agreed with the statement "I want to live in a society in which man is more important than money" indicating post-materialism (Election Studies (Germany) 2002). Inglehart also notes that, contrary to expectations, these post-materialistic ideals do not diminish during economic hardship and are sustained overtime, which we see in Germany during the 1990s. When writing on the emerging environmental movement within Germany, Karl-Werner Brand discusses how the movement developed an incredibly "strong integrating power;" "Though no new comprehensive ideology emerged, at the end of the decade a common criticism of technocratic society and industrial growth, and a vague 'ecotopian' vision of an alternative society, became the culturally integrating basis of oppositional, left-libertarian milieux" (Brand

1999, 42). This illustrates that a criticism of the same industrial growth that led to a comfortable society was becoming more common within society, indicative of Inglehart's theory.

Germany's economic capability to take on more burden directly relates to its citizens being comfortable enough to refocus their basic material needs and accept "environmentalism" as a post-material ideal. As Brand posits, "The legitimacy of environmentalist concerns is no longer controversial; what is debated is how they can appropriately and efficiently be combined with economic and social concerns" (Brand 1999, 46). Post-materialism helps explain how these environmental ideals have been normalized and accepted over time, leading to a greening of German society.

Normalization and a New German Identity

Germany's recent history has shaped its national identity significantly, producing emerging normative sentiments and a responsibility to the world. These sentiments have suffused many aspects of German society including Germany's eco-movement. Guilt from WWII and the effects of reunification have both had important influence over German identity through the 20th century. The period of time during reunification in the 1990s is often referred to as "normalization." Chancellor Kohl of the FRG said in an interview with the New York Times that he hoped Germany would normalize so as not to be such a "singular" country, which it was, due to its past as a divided nation. Moreover, until the late 1990s the Holocaust was regarded as a purely German responsibility, further singling out Germany as an "abnormal nation" (Harnisch and Longhurst 2006, 60). Stephen Brockman argues in his chapter "Normalization: Has Helmut Kohl's Vision Been Realized?" that Germany has sought to create a new, unconventional national identity that embraces national shame as well as national pride. Germany's national shame of the Holocaust can be witnessed firsthand by visiting the Holocaust memorial in the center of Berlin. This memorial is argued to be "unique and unprecedented in the history of nation-states" (Brockman 2006, 27). Germany could have erased or relativized memories of the Holocaust or even asserted that other nations have similar histories of genocide. Instead it built a monument in the heart of its capital city so that this national shame is front and center, shaping the space and the people who pass through it in a way disparate from other countries.

Despite the pervasive presence of memorials in Berlin, the final products have not always been accepted in full. "The 1990s saw seemingly endless and heated debates about [the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe], especially regarding its size and monumentality" and many argue that the large memorial and ones like it "monumentalized" the Nazi crimes, making them inaccessible to everyday people; instead of stirring compassion, it brewed indifference in Germans (Lepenies 2006, 205). Author

Günter Grass, for example, argues that remembrance of the Holocaust must also consist of remembering not only Nazi crimes but the crimes of everyday citizens, the "daily loss of decency," whereby citizens stood by silently rather than say something (Lepenies 2006, 208). There are smaller memorials in Berlin that many argue, including author Wolf Lepenies, are not given enough attention compared to the larger memorials. "These small memorials...disturbingly recall that the Nazis could commit their heinous crimes only because normal Germans showed too little civil courage in their daily affairs. Such remembrances hold up a mirror to each citizen" (Lepenies 2006, 208). This reflection on remembrance further emphasizes the singularity of this aspect of Germany where the emphasis is then placed on remembering all aspects of German national history, shame and pride, creating a national consciousness.

Even so, national pride in Germany is relatively high when compared to its European counterparts. In a Pew Research Center survey, 52% of Germans disagreed with and 47% agreed with the statement, "Our people are not perfect, but our culture is superior to others;" this was only slightly behind the US where 49% of people agreed with the statement while Britain and France reported 32% and 27% agreement (Media Inquiries 2011). This mix of pride into national consciousness makes the emerging national identity even more singular through "normalization." After WWII, when faced with extreme political disappointment, German culture was revitalized and seemed to be the only aspect of society "left with a legitimate past and hopes for the future" while at the same time " shaped by experiences of emigration, exile, and reimmigration" (Lepenies 2006, 146). German history as far back as the Vienna Congress in 1815 has involved a lack of political unity which was reaffirmed by the separation of Germany after WWII (Lepenies 2006). This had led to a societal need for cultural cohesion which has contributed to this notion of the uniqueness of German culture.

In sum, many aspects of German society required rebuilding and recreating after WWII. This coincided with a sentiment that the partition of Germany was essentially penance for the Holocaust, and when reunification became a real possibility the political will to reshape Germany's image was substantial. What resulted from this reshaping was a notion that Germany had a new role to play on the international stage, one of responsibility. In a 1991 speech by Chancellor Helmut Kohl to the Bundestag, he emphasized how a unified Germany must take on a "new role" of "responsibility" and live up to its expectations (Munich Bayerischer Rundfunk Network 1991, 23). This reveals a sentiment that a new, reunified Germany had now been given the chance to 'prove themselves' and has attempted to do so by taking on the responsibility of global problems. This moral rhetoric is also present before reunification so, although reunification may have created an outlet for international action in the realm of German responsibility, these norms would have had to at least been forming since the end of WWII.

The translation of German responsibility into action could not be more starkly illustrated than in its intervention in Kosovo. World War I and II significantly impacted German foreign policy. After WWII, many institutions were created, including the EU, with some intention of containing Germany and preventing another world war however, the economic rebuilding of West Germany (FRG) was also of strategic interest to countries like the United States during this period. This essentially tied the FRG to Western interests. In order to become a member of NATO and to be a Western ally, the FRG's strategic culture was required to shift to one of demilitarization. Therefore, during the Cold War, the FRG adopted a pacifist stance which preferred "civilian power" over the use of the military in solving conflicts (Brockman 2006, 23). It created new laws and infrastructure that ultimately bound it to multilateral interests and international law rather than domestic interests (Harnisch and Longhurst 2006, 51). The normalization of Germany has altered this stance to project a more traditional foreign policy, which employs military force if necessary however Germany's commitment to multilateralism as established during the Cold War has not faltered. German employment of military force was exemplified in 1999 when troops were deployed for a NATO operation in Kosovo -- without a UN mandate, potentially indicating a disregard for multilateralism. Strikingly, however, this use of German military force was in line with Schröder's definition of German normality -- which he defined in 1998 as a commitment to international cooperation, multilateralism, and the protection of universal human rights (Taberner et al. 2006, 9) -- because the mission's purpose was to defend universal human rights, which were being violated in the genocide in Kosovo. This commitment to NATO also shows Germany's commitment to multilateralism and burden sharing because NATO is an organization that employs burden sharing as a mechanism for collective defense. More so, however, Kosovo exposes a moral component within German strategic culture.

Germany's involvement in the war in Kosovo was the first combat mission for the German military, the *Bundeswehr*, since it was created in the 1950s (Harnisch and Longhurst 2006, 52). Until the intervention, the *Bundeswehr* could only be used defensively. Its use not only broke several national taboos about using military force -- especially concerning locations where the Nazi forces (*Wehrmacht*) had occupied during WWII -- but it was also significant because it had an "overtly humanitarian objective" (Harnisch and Longhurst 2006, 53). Chancellor Schröder publically stated that Germany had no other option than to be involved because it had a "moral obligation" and a responsibility to end the war (Harnisch and Longhurst 2006). German strategic culture has continued to emphasize non-military solutions and multilateralism showing Kosovo as an exception underlain with humanitarian and moral objectives. A 2015 survey by Pew Research Center found that, "Germans (58%) were the most likely [of those surveyed] to say their country should not use military force to protect a NATO ally if attacked by

Russia. And just 19% of Germans support sending arms to Ukraine in response to the Russian threat" (Kohut and Stokes 2015). However, more than half of Germans (54%) favor US engagement in order to 'help other countries,' which was the highest of those countries surveyed besides Spain (Media Inquiries 2011). This potentially hints at a prevailing value of solidarity that extends beyond Germany's borders, as we see with the EU principles in Chapter II. As shown, Germany's recent past has contributed to a formation of a new national identity, evoking notions of moral responsibility to important issue areas like economic cooperation, human rights, and protection of the environment.

This moral responsibility is clearly evident in German political rhetoric. In an interview with the German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, he states that, "The FRG acts out of historic responsibility, out of national and European responsibility" (Hamburg Der Spiegel 1985, J2). These sentiments were echoed in East Germany in a 1986 5-year plan directive issued by Congress that states that East Germany must "continue reliably to fulfill its international responsibility as a cornerstone of socialism and peace in Europe" (East Berlin Neues Deutschland 1986, J1). Here notions of both solidarity with Europe and moral responsibility were present in German rhetoric on both sides of the border. Moreover, this shows that German responsibility is not limited to the environmental field and indicates that the principle of solidarity is politically salient. This rhetoric has translated into action, as illustrated with Kosovo and Kyoto, through involvement and German legislation.

Germany's commitment to environmental responsibility is illuminated in German laws, when it became commonplace in the 1990s. Article 20a of German Basic Law states a responsibility to future generations. The 1990 Unification Treaty Article 34(1) stated that "it shall be the task of the legislators to protect the natural basis of man's existence, with due regard for prevention, the polluter-pays principle, and cooperation, and to promote uniform ecological conditions of a high standard at least equivalent to that reached in the Federal Republic of Germany" (Unification Treaty 1990). This contributed to the Forty-second Amendment to Basic Law in 1994, which added Article 20(a) proposing to be "mindful also of its responsibility toward future generations, the state shall protect the natural foundations of life and animals by legislation and, in accordance with law and justice, by executive and judicial action, all within the framework of the constitutional order" (Basic Law 2014, 27; Hanschel 2006, 186). By making it part of its constitutions, Germany solidified its moral argument for environmental protection for the sake of protecting future generations. This sentiment has been restated throughout many of the speeches I examined including in a speech made by Chancellor Helmut Kohl in 1987, "To preserve creation must also mean to protect the environment and maintain it for our children and grandchildren" (Cologne Westdeutscher Rundfunk Network 1987, J8). It was also echoed by Henry Schramm of East Germany's Green Party, "whoever preaches unfettered consumption in Europe and in doing so forgoes the damaged

environment, is forgetting our children and grandchildren" (East Berlin ADN 1990, 36), illustrating that this sentiment was present in both West and East Germany. The presence of these ideas on both sides of the Berlin wall further facilitated the legitimization of environmentalism after reunification. Along with the precautionary principle, mentioned in Chapter II, this emphasis on protecting future generations indicates a moral component to German motivations. Because the moral argument is pervasive in many aspects of German society, the fact the environmental movement was incorporated into this rhetoric has been significant for its widespread acceptance. The origins of these norms can be traced back, in part, to guilt over WWII because Germany has significantly altered its national and political identity to distance itself from that era.

Not simply ubiquitous in the political rhetoric, the German public has also illustrated a sustained commitment to their concern for "environmental protection." In 1993, a Eurobarometer survey found that inflation was the top priority issue in nearly all EU member states, while it tied for first place with "environmental protection" in Germany (European Commission 1993). "Environmental protection" has remained a top concern over the years however, it has naturally fluctuated in position priority most likely due to other pressing issues, like economic growth. The commitment has been sustained, as illustrated by a 2009 Pew Research Center survey that found that 60% of Germans think global warming is a "very serious problem" (Media Inquiries 2009). This is further evidence of how all three of these factors have contributed to a widespread acceptance of environmental issues within German society where environmental concerns are "no longer controversial" (Brand 1999).

I have attempted to show how the German landscape has shaped German 'identity' -- as if there is just one -- through the years, which has contributed to an emphasis on unifying societal needs with environmental protection. Moreover, after WWII, a notion of moral responsibility emerged, which imbued many aspects of German society, including the growing environmental movement of the 1980s and 1990s. The economic prosperity of the postwar period also allowed citizens to focus on post-materialistic ideals. Therefore,the German sense of responsibility for environmental action, a prevailing fondness for nature in German culture, and its secure economic status all made it easy to accept environmentalism as legitimate. This all contributed to the normative, not purely interest-based, motivation for German environmental policy that infiltrates the rhetoric and adds dimension to an environmental movement that was institutionalized in the 1980s, and was then projected internationally through the 1990s. This I will discuss in these next sections. Therefore, the acceptance of the BSA in 1997 was not only a logical next step but an obligation.

The Institutionalization of Environmentalism

"In postwar Germany, rebuilding the nation eclipsed almost all other concerns, including the environment, and even as rebuilding evolved into West Germany's 'economic miracle', Germans continued to focus on expanding the economy and enjoying their prosperity" (Markham 2005, 668). It wasn't until economic reconstruction was no longer a primary focus that "quickly rising sensitivity to environmental problems" started gaining traction in the late 1960s (Brand 1999, 39). As mentioned above, in its early stages, the environmental movement sought to distance itself from what is referred to as the "Brown" environmentalism of the past: "[Dr. Boaz] Neumann points out that in Germany, in the period immediately after the Second World War, green activists built themselves up as an antithesis to the Nazis. Environmental activists sought to use their ideology to atone for the sins of the past. The memory of the destruction the Nazis caused fueled activities aimed at the prevention of similar disasters in the future" (Zandberg 2013). In this way, the green movement that emerged was wary of language that produced rigid dichotomies: "pure" landscapes vs. landscapes that have been imposed upon, or that the "ecological order must be imposed on the relationship between the organism and its environment" (Zandberg 2013). Dr. Neumann discusses that this distinguishes German environmentalism from that of, say, Greenpeace, which identifies enemies of the "natural habitat." As Karl-Werner Brand writes, "Social movements such as environmental action groups live on their capacity to mobilise moral protest. An ideal constellation exists when conflicts can be staged as a conflict between a 'David' fighting for a just cause and a 'Goliath' who can be portrayed as the clear villain. These conditions are rarely found in Germany today" (Brand 1999, 46). From the get-go, the German environmental movement has sought to unify environmental protection with the needs and development of society rather than keeping the two as distinctive spheres where one needs to be emphasized more than the other. This has contributed to its legitimacy within society.

In the 1970s the work of local citizen's initiatives (*Bürgerinitiativen*) that focused on ecological protection started gaining recognition within the public and providing information on environmental issues. Many of these citizen's initiatives were loosely organized and short-lived but they did succeed in getting broader public support or sympathy for these issues (Markham 2005, 670). The delay present here between WWII and the resurgence of the environmental movement confirms Ronald Inglehart's theory of post-materialism because while Germany was rebuilding during the immediate postwar period, the environmental movement was non existent. Inglehart writes, "Further persuasive evidence of an intergenerational shift toward Post-Materialist priorities among the German public is found in the massive

and definitive analysis of German survey data from 1953 through 1976 by Baker, Dalton and Hildebrandt (1981)" (Inglehart 1981, 883); this shift he discusses coincides with the emerging environmental movement.

In 1972, the Federal Alliance of Citizen's Initiatives for Environmental Protection (BBU) was created, with offices all around the country. It primarily succeeded in staging protests for the "green" and anti-nuclear movement when local and federal governments would not budge on issues. During this time in 1970s, the environmental 'movement' was not completely unified. There were distinct cleavages between a "rural resistance to the 'arrogance of power' of 'those up there'" and the left-libertarians (Brand 1999, 43). It was their common disapproval of nuclear energy that ultimately brought these opposing groups together in mass protests and formed a collective 'movement' in the later 1970s. Out of this grew a network of communications between the groups created by local, regional, and national news organizations -- this eventually laid the foundation for the Green Party. The presence of concern for ecological degradation in the general public was not lost on government officials and in May 1979 Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, in his opening address at the European Nuclear Conference in Hamburg, stated that "I believe it is conceivable that in a few years this problem of CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere and the associated expectations of climate changes...will evoke discussions that are equally as emotional as those about the exact consequences of Harrisburg" (Hatch 1995, 416). Also in 1979, within the German Physics Society, the Energy Working Circle (*Arbeitskreis Energie,* or AKE) was formed to inform leaders in government about current and future problems involving Germany's energy supply. Although Chancellor Schmidt gave an early warning about climate change, the issue remained largely ignored by the public until much later.

By 1980, climate change had come to the AKE's agenda and by 1983, AKE wanted to make its concerns about climate change public (Hatch 1995, 420). They released a statement that warned against climate change and proposed nuclear and solar as the only feasible energy sources. Yet few people paid any attention. Despite this, other environmental issues were becoming increasingly salient in Germany and within the German electorate. In the early 1980s, the Green Party (the Greens) formed and other environmental groups like Greenpeace Germany cropped up, which made the BBU nearly obsolete. Throughout the 1980s, the Greens gained popularity, which was evident to other political parties in Germany who started adopting their own environmental platforms. These platforms largely focused on forest dieback (*Waldsterben)*, which became a pressing issue when the public realized that acid rain was contributing to the degradation of forests.

Due to the importance of forests in German culture, as they are are viewed as a central part of their landscape and society, it is no surprise that forest dieback resonated among Germans (Goodbody

2002). The link between emissions, pollution, and forest dieback spurred political action by Chancellor Kohl of the CDU when he took office in the early 1980s. In Kohl's statement to the Bundestag in 1985, he not only mentioned that forests required protection but he also expressed German norms of solidarity and responsibility by stating, "Solidarity in the generations is also involved in the protection of the environment's natural bases of life" (Cologne ARD Television Network 1985, J10).

Growing concern for forest dieback was coupled with increasing international concern for the ozone layer, which put environmental issues further onto the German political agenda. Forest dieback as a West German problem and air pollution as an East German problem were conveyed in the 1985 State of the Nation address by Kohl (Mainz ZDF Television Network 1985, J10). This growing concern for pollution and ecological degradation, and the adoption of "environment" into political parties on both the left (e.g.. the Greens) and right (e.g. the CDU) essentially institutionalized the environmental movement. The bipartisanship of environmental concern and its institutionalization reflects the confidence German's put in their government to solve these problems and makes the examination of political speeches particularly pertinent. In two surveys, taken in 1991 and 2003, the Times Mirror and Pew Research Center both found that about 90% of Germans either "completely agreed" or "mostly agreed" that it was the government's responsibility to take care of people who cannot take care of themselves (Times Mirror 1991; Pew Research Center 2003). This aligns with a World Values Survey from 1995-1999 that found most Germans (57%) feel it is the government's responsibility is to maintain order in society over respecting the freedoms of the individual, of which only 37% agreed (World Values Survey 1999), all pointing to a confidence in government. The institutionalization of the eco-movement solidified environmental values as a new aspect of Germany's organizational, hierarchical, and economy-oriented society, furthering its acceptance.

The Climate Debate

The AKE's warnings on climate change largely went unnoticed until its report in 1986, which coincided with the Chernobyl nuclear accident. Chernobyl is credited with the ignition of what we think of as today's environmental movement in Germany although, as we can see, there had been mobilization since the 1970s. After Chernobyl, Chancellor Kohl stated in an address to the Bundestag that, "I hope the recent experience will further all countries' readiness not only to talk about international responsibility, but also to act on it" (Cologne ARD Television Network 1986, J8). Here he is referring to a responsibility he claims all countries have to protection of the environment. The AKE's 1986 report was soon attacked by representatives of the coal industry because it warned against the use of fossil fuels. The coal industry

is of high importance to Germany and the industry-oriented political parties because it is Germany's only significant domestic energy source (Hatch 1995, 417). Although Germany often faced opposing views from interest groups, political parties, and ministries, environmental regulations were still passed. This illustrates not only the German government's ability to build consensus over sensitive issues but also that there would have had to have been a uniting factor between disagreeing parties. The government, although it protected industry in many ways, saw protection of the nonhuman spheres of the German landscape as a necessity for reasons that were not purely economically and interest based. This indicates that normative notions of responsibility played a key role. Moreover, it pursued the exportation of its regulations on industry to have the best of both worlds: to protect the environment while keeping its industry competitive, evident of another effort to unify environmental and economic efforts. Even with political backing, industry began working towards establishing a better "environmental image," especially in the chemical and car industries, "Environmental management became a central topic in industrial debates, and eco-consulting a booming industry. 'Ecological modernisation' became the central organising idea of political and economic debates" (Brand 1999, 41). The contribution of business helped facilitate the greening of German society because "environment" was now widely accepted as an important aspect of society. Although it was widely accepted, the issue of national energy after Chernobyl remained highly contentious. The nuclear debate simultaneously brought climate change to the public's attention while also encouraging a shelving of the issue.

The debate around global climate change in Germany is said to have truly started after the Chernobyl accident, inextricably linking the climate change debate to nuclear power for years to come. The Federal Ministry for the Environment (BMU) was created in 1986, following Chernobyl, under the Interior Ministry, which had been handling environmental issues since the 1970s. However, the issue of climate change was given to the Transport Ministry because of its control of "meteorological questions" (Hatch 1995, 426) and was not transferred to the BMU until 1988 showing the disregard for the issue until the late '80s. After the Chernobyl accident, environmental groups and the Greens started attacking the presence of nuclear energy in Germany. The Greens' push for the shutdown of all nuclear facilities gained significant traction within the general public and they won 8.3% of the vote in the 1987 federal elections, which was up from 5.6% in 1983 (Hatch 1995, 421). Proponents of nuclear power saw the concerns about climate change raised by AKE as a sufficient counter argument to proponents of *Ausstieg* (the exit from nuclear power). Thus, climate change was linked to nuclear power in a way that made the Greens and environmental groups shy away from the issue.

An important facet of the environmental movement in Germany at this time was that support for environmental reform was not restricted to left, liberal voters (Hatch 1995, 422). So when the Greens

were gaining support, both the Socialist Democratic Party (SPD) and the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) -- which were arguably on the left and right on the political spectrum, respectfully -- put environmental issues on their agendas. The SPD adopted positions that promoted nuclear phase-out while the CDU, which was "long the party of big industry," passed legislation relating to forest dieback as well as adopted the position of the AKE: it makes sense to support the nuclear industry when presented with the threat of global warming (Hatch 1995). This further illustrates not only an institutionalization but also an acceptance of environmentalism -- political parties each opportunistically adopted their own environmental platforms, pointing to its legitimacy within a wide voter base.

As public concern for environmental issues fell on both the left and right politically creating bipartisan support for environmental legislation, the question shifted from whether or not to pass environmental legislation to how to tackle this environmental issue. This marked the beginning of environmentalism becoming an integral societal concern that was present in both sides of Berlin prior to reunification. Yet, while climate change lacked bipartisan support in the midst of the highly politicized nuclear debate, progress on climate change was nonexistent. Meanwhile, popular issues, like forest dieback, that held bipartisan support were passed through legislation instead. *Die Welt* in 1987 analyzed the Bundestag election results and found that "environment" as a theme in the elections topped precedence but was not decisive in the elections, meaning it could not be aligned with one party. "Environment" only became decisive when it was linked with the chemical industry, which then divided the issue between the industry supporters (e.g. the CDU) and the SDP, and the Greens (Bonn Die Welt 1987). Here we can see the widespread legitimacy of what were considered environmental issues. The divisive nature of these issues is shifted away from whether or not it's necessary to enact policy to what is the best way to enact policy. Germany, because of recent history, aspects of its culture, and its comfortable economic standing, has legitimized environmental issues which facilitated its rise as an international leader in environmental policy.

The above indicates that part of the reason Germany was able to pass the level of environmental legislation that it did was because of this bipartisan support, and that that support was institutionalized. This could have been due, in part, to Germany's coalition and parliamentary system. However, there was also significant bipartisan support for environmental legislation in the 1970s and 1980s in the United States. During this period, the US passed laws that were among the most stringent in the world. Meanwhile, during the 1990s these issues were increasingly politicized leading to a drop in bipartisan support for environmental laws and thus, even today some of the strictest environmental policies in the US were passed in the '70s and '80s (Vogel 2012, 35). This indicates that a country does not need to have a parliamentary system for this to happen, which is good for exportability of the BSA. Taken together,

this means that because Germany was able to sustain this support through political turnover while the US was not, there is more at play than simply a type of political system that led Germany to adopt the BSA. Bipartisan support and depoliticization of environmental issues certainly increased the level of environmental legislation passed however, this was due to the institutionalization of environmentalism facilitated by an overall acceptance of the issues. The bipartisan support further represents the solidification of "environment" as a societal issue. Germany's unique moral argument, stemming from postwar national identity, could have been part of why 'environmental protection' had such a profound and sustained impact in Germany while the US's bipartisan support and citizen interest sputtered and fizzled out. German culture and its social welfare state, which help explain the presence of post-material ideals in Germany, also would have contributed to why bipartisan support endured in Germany but not in the US.

The Role of the Inquiry Commission

Due to the disagreement around the politically charged climate debate and subsequent political inaction, after the January 1987 elections the CDU and the Free Democratic Party (FDP) established the Inquiry Commission on Preventive Measures to Protect the Atmosphere (*Enquete Kommission*) to address the complex issue of global warming. Its job was to "collect evidence on global changes in the Earth's atmosphere...and to propose national and international measures of prevention and control in the interest of protecting both man and the environment" (Hatch 1995, 423). Only 11 months later it released its first report, *Protecting the Earth's Atmosphere: An International Challenge*, which identified climate change as a critical and anthropogenically induced issue. Subsequent reports suggested policy routes for Germany to take, including ones with and without the use of nuclear energy. At this point in time, there was a "political vacuum" in leadership on climate change (Hatch 1995, 425). Environmental interest groups and political parties alike steered clear of the climate change issue mainly because of the nuclear debate. However, even political parties that supported nuclear power like the CDU were hesitant to address climate change because of their strong ties to the coal industry. The Inquiry Commission filled in the gaps in leadership and put climate change back on the political agenda.

Germany has consistently established and utilized working groups and other epistemic communities, like the Inquiry Commission and the AKE, to help guide government decisions on issues like climate change and better inform them of the right decision. Germany has a consensus-focused government and Jürgen Habermas's discourse ethics can help explain why Germany emphasizes consensus when arriving at political decisions. He argued that rationality is a key component of using

discourse to arrive at universal norms (Jaggard 2007, 324). In fact, German philosopher Immanuel Kant's view was that 'reason' means that individuals should not only think for themselves but also from others' point of view and "consistently and rationally." He proposed that when this is accomplished, a consensus that will be reached that is fair for all parties, thus making action "justifiable and universalizable" – he calls this the Categorical Imperative. In Lyn Jaggard's chapter "The reflexivity of ideas in climate change policy," she points out that Habermas's discourse model reflects a variation of the Categorical Imperative and thus posits that when consensus is reached -- like on climate change -- a universal norm is created. Germany has utilized consensus in its political system and attempts to include a wide variety of interests in the decision-making process. By doing so they legitimized norms of responsibility by means of discourse ethics. This offers insight into how these norms were institutionalized, and helps explains how climate change became accepted with other environmental issues: consensus achieved through the Inquiry Commission portrayed climate change rational and universal.

The Commission also emphasized the precautionary principle and efficiency in their reports and many of the policies put forth by the German government worked on increasing the efficiency of energy use in Germany. During the global oil crisis in the 1970s, German economic growth was predicted to slow as energy use decreased. This caused the use of coal to actually increase to make up for the discrepancy in oil. Instead of overall energy use increasing, however, energy use was made more efficient and actually decreased during this time. Not only does this point to a propensity for penny-pinching during this period, as Germany was still rebuilding economically, but this also emulates Germany's preference for prioritizing efficiency in order to cut its emissions, which the Commission emphasized. Additionally, because energy use was made more efficient, German businesses in the late 1980s more willing to adopt policies to reduce carbon emissions, which contributed to the legitimacy of these policies (Jaggard 2007, 328). The Inquiry Commission essentially made it so that, going into the 1990s, the debate around climate shifted to discussing how much Germany should limit its emissions and by what means rather than perpetually linking it to the nuclear debate. Here we can see that climate change was elevated to the level of other issues, like forest dieback, that were already widely accepted in Germany. Thus, by June 1990 the federal cabinet adopted a goal of 25% reduction by 2005 compared to 1987 levels (Hatch 1995, 428). This was before the establishment of the UNFCCC and before emission targets were brought up within the EU. That Germany did this of its own volition without first seeking commitments from other countries, indicates further that objective-interests were not the main priority and more so that Germany had a responsibility to limit its emissions making this the logical next step. It was around this time that proponents of climate change policies, like leaders within the BMU, started pushing for Germany to take on more of a leadership role in climate policy. The Inquiry Commission working group put climate

change on the political agenda, which caused the public (and environmental groups and parties) to start paying attention. Soon, climate change was adopted into the same moral rhetoric that had been used for other environmental issues.

Chancellor Kohl's statement to the Bundestag in January 1991 was the first time he mentioned atmospheric climate change in his speeches rather than nuclear energy or forest dieback. He mentioned how "economical use and compatibility with the environment" are cornerstones in his new energy policy (Munich Bayerischer Rundfunk Network 1991, 10). This is echoed in a World Values Survey 1995-1999 that showed that 94% of Germans thought that "humans should coexist with nature" rather than master it (World Values Survey 1999) again illustrating the emphasis on unifying 'human' and 'nature' rather than perpetuating the dichotomy. In this same speech Kohl expresses how there is a "necessary sense of responsibility for environmental and nature protection" in everyday life (Munich Bayerischer Rundfunk Network 1991, 12) and references how a reunified Germany now has a new role of responsibility, again pointing to how Germany's recent past has shaped its political as well as national identity. Kohl also states that restoring East Germany would require "solidarity and responsibility" from all Germans as well as echoes the sentiment that, "Only if we restore peace to nature, will our home country continue to be worth living in and can it be passed on undamaged to future generations" (Mainz ZDF Television Network 1991, 12). These sentiments are not simply illustrated in Kohl's rhetoric. In a speech by SPD's Bjorn Engholm he calls environmental responsibility a German responsibility (Mainz ZDF Television Network 1991, 14) and emphasizes "above all a Germany which uses its new size and its strength to support the weaker countries in Europe and the world economically, socially, and ecologically -- however, not for other purposes" (Mainz ZDF Television Network 1991, 17). Both politicians explicitly mention German responsibility to their environment, to other Germans, and to the world.

Germany and the 1990s

The conversation around the EU's first emissions goal policy was not always smooth. The European industry lobby pushed back against several policies, like an EU-wide CO2 tax, that could make the EU less economically competitive and was able to get the EU to alter its policies and appeal to industry. A similar series of events occurred in Germany. In Germany, the BMU and the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWi) often argued over policies presented to the federal government. Unsurprisingly, during economic 'good times,' the BMU was more successful in getting environmental policy through, while during the recession that occurred when Germany was incurring huge costs from the reunification process, the BMWi won several battles (Hatch 1995). It should be noted

here that reunification played a huge role in Germany's ability to transform itself into a hyper-efficient economy because East Germany, before reunification, was wrought with environmental problems and was highly inefficient. From 1987 to 1993, German emissions declined 14.7%. This was due to the collapse of East Germany's economy and subsequent shift to efficient fuel sources (Hatch 1995, 433). Because of these "wall fall profits," several EU member states argued that Germany should have actually accepted more burden as they viewed these emissions reductions as "freebies" (Aidt and Greiner 2002). Not only does this express Germany's commitment to efficiency and economy, but it also portrays Germany as an objectively-interested, one could say "normal," state which could mean that while the BSA was a logical next step, Germany's actions are not necessarily unusual for a nation-state.

Through the 1990s, Germany became more involved with international climate change even as the country suffered an economic downturn in 1995 (Directorate General 2002). In 1995, Germany hosted the first COP, in Berlin, which produced the Berlin Mandate and, through the 1990s, continued to be an important player in negotiations. Despite all of the effort to decouple ecological degradation from economy, the economic downturn still slightly turned the focus away from environmental protection to renewed economic prosperity. In 1995, "environmental disaster" was listed as the number one fear in Germany ahead of "social misery" and "crime" while in 1998, "environmental protection" as a priority slipped from 5th in the previous year to 18th (Hamburg Der Spiegel 1995, 18; Andrews 1998). This should not be surprising. What is surprising, however, is despite the emphasis on economic reforms, "environmental protection" was still mentioned on every party platform and as a moral imperative. In 1995, the SPD made a statement on their platform, emphasizing commitment to the environment: "Pointing out that the SPD views itself as the representative of those who want to combine economic efficiency, ecological responsibility, and social justice and not play them off against each other" (Munich Sueddeutsche Zeitung 1995, 16). Around this time, Germany adopted sustainable development as one of the pillars of the German agenda (Brand 1999). Meanwhile, Chancellor Kohl stated in a speech on the 1996 budget to the Bundestag, "We have always advocated Ludwig Erhard's idea of the social market economy. These are two important concepts, not mere words -- namely market economy and social responsibility. This is and continues to be our policy" (Munich ARD Television Network 1995, 13). This commitment once again illustrates that Germany is unwilling to give up two aspects that are very important to its welfare: economic prosperity and a healthy environment. This is reconciled by the adoption of environmental protection into 'top-tier' societal issues, like economics.

The 1997 Kyoto Protocol was regarded as a watershed agreement on climate change. During these negotiations, the EU negotiated as a unit and accepted their Kyoto target as a unit. Although they were allocated 8% below 1990 levels, some other actors at the table like Japan thought that because of the

“bubble” agreement the EU should have actually been allocated more due to the interests of “equity and transparency” (Mcdonald 1997). Germany’s role came during the negotiations of the Council of Ministers both before and after the Kyoto conference. There is no evidence to suggest that Germany pushed back significantly during these negotiations against its proposed allocation. This is because accepting this burden would have been a logical next step for Germany and a political obligation.

During this time in the 1990s in Germany, many actors in the environmental movement were discussing the ‘end of the environmental movement’ from its original form. This happened because the environmental movement had become an established societal actor rather than a “misfit and social critic” (Brand 1999, 50). The sustained attention to environmentalism, if no longer top priority, during an economic downturn further supports Ronald Inglehart’s theory of post-materialism. This shows that the environmental movement in Germany grew and adapted to the needs of society, similar to how post-materialist ideals evolve generationally. The first generation of environmental movement focused on societal concerns, like that of forest dieback which resonated deeply in German culture. The Greens and growing acceptance of the movement institutionalized environmentalism through the 1980s, which not only led to increased attention from politicians but also from businesses, adding legitimacy to the movement. During this time, environmental issues, including climate change, were adopted into the moral rhetoric that focused on German responsibility. This further widened the support base as it resonated deeply with German national identity. This rhetoric transferred into policy and facilitated the rise of Germany as a leader on the international stage on climate change, where it urged the EU and the world to pursue similarly ambitious emission reduction targets. Culminating in the adoption of Kyoto, the EU BSA was then the logical next step. It was logical that Germany would accept an ambitious burden, despite its powerful role within the EU, given the history of its environmental movement. This is because environmental values have imbued society, have been legitimized over time, and are therefore sustained over time through political turmoil or economic downturn.

Chapter IV

The Exportability of Burden Sharing: A Discussion

Were German Motivations Uniquely German?

So what factors led to Germany's motivations for joining the burden sharing agreement? We can see with careful examination of the history of the environmental movement in Germany that the burden sharing agreement was a logical next step for Germany and was no surprise at the time. Germany had already passed national emission reduction goals that were even more stringent at times than the EU-wide goals and was very active in international agreements. Germany's environmental movement and subsequent enactment of many environmental policies illustrate its commitment to environmental protection due to its legitimacy across society. I have argued that Germany's sense of responsibility, thriving culture, and role as an economic powerhouse were all driving factors in Germany's emerging leadership in the climate regime, which together facilitated this legitimacy. Therefore, accepting a large burden was a no-brainer and was more of the norm.

Over the years, the focus has been on many different environmental issues as they come up: forest dieback, air pollution, and then climate change, all of which were adopted into the same moral rhetoric that stressed German responsibility and, in some cases, the principle of solidarity. Germany was motivated, in part, by a moral imperative to protect the environment for the sake of future generations, and it felt it had a responsibility to stand with its neighbor states and, eventually, the world on climate change. As mentioned above, the question of responsibility would seem to play an important role in the acceptance of burden. After all, the distribution of burden is a distribution of responsibility. Germany's moral imperative was an idea ubiquitous in the political rhetoric on both sides of the border however, it was not so apparent in other countries in the EU and even other environmental leaders like the Netherlands and Denmark. Upon an analysis of political rhetoric in Britain, France, the Netherlands, and Denmark from 1986-1990, I found no evidence of responsibility mentioned as a moral imperative for environmental protection as in the German case. In each country during this time, there was a growing awareness and concern for environmental issues as well as political recognition of this, yet still no mention of an inherent "responsibility." This would indicate that this was a distinctly German responsibility.

German Responsibility

Despite the emphasis on responsibility in recent German history, which was certainly a driving political factor, within society this 'German sense of responsibility' was not as unique and was actually very similar to other European countries. When asked if they agreed with the statement "I feel a sense of responsibility to society," 16% of Germans surveyed, 16% of people in the UK, and 18% of Americans responded this "completely describes me" (GlobeScan et al. 2012).[2] According to attribution theory, guilt has been associated with feelings of moral responsibility (Weiner 1995). In that same survey that addressed responsibility, when asked "I feel guilty about my own negative impact on the environment" 5% of Germans, 8% of people in the UK, and 9% of Americans answered this "completely describes me." Other surveys that surveyed more members of the EU found similar trends when thinking about responsibility. When asked if they agreed with the statement, "The European Union and its members have a responsibility to help other member countries that get into financial/ fiscal trouble," only 5% of Germans "strongly agreed" compared to 9% in Great Britain and France, 14% in Italy, and 33% in Spain. Interestingly, Germany had the highest percentage of people respond "strongly disagree" with 19% (Financial Times 2010). Another 2010 survey by Financial Times asked whether or not developed countries should "have a responsibility to help less developed and third world countries cope with extreme food price fluctuations." The survey found that in all countries surveyed (US, Great Britain, France, Italy, Spain, and Germany) about 10% of people answered "strongly agree" to the above question (Finance Times 2010). Moreover, a 2004 GlobeScan survey found that between 57 and 67% of Europeans out of the countries surveyed (Germany, UK, France, Italy, and Spain) "strongly agreed" with the statement that "Rich countries have the moral responsibility to help poor countries develop" (GlobeScan 2004). Germany and Italy were the highest with 68 and 67%, respectively. In Canada only 53% of people "strongly agreed" and in the US, 41%. While these numbers do not report statistical significance, this indicates that while German actions within the international climate regime have been unique, this feeling of responsibility for people outside of the immediate social sphere is not unique to Germany and is, in fact, similar to many other countries.

Responsibility was a political factor for Germany in burden sharing yet not for any other country, which begs the question: how integral is this feeling of responsibility to burden sharing? Within the EU and Germany this responsibility has been legalized through the principle of precaution and the protection of the environment for future generations. These principles create a moral argument centered around

[2] GlobeScan is an evidence-led strategy consultancy.

protection for human society, which allows for a broader acceptance of the argument and thus of the policies. In Germany, this responsibility helped facilitate a widespread acceptance of environmental issues, which made accepting burden logical. This indicates that to generate widespread support for an issue like climate change, society must also feel connected to it through a feeling of responsibility. It is as if the kitchen sink has become piled with dishes and everyone in the house has contributed to the mess. If no one feels responsible for their share of the dishes, nothing will get washed. On the flip side, if they do feel responsible, the kitchen will get clean and stay clean. This feeling of responsibility has been legalized through the principles above and may be necessary for the societal acceptance and exportability of the BSA. Therefore, the exportability of these legal principles outside of Germany bodes well for the exportability of the BSA. As noted, the principle of precaution was adopted by the EU and the protection of the environment for future generations was eventually adopted by the UNFCCC, meaning that these principles of responsibility are generalizable outside of Germany. Yet, Europe's shared history, which was similarly impacted by two world wars, could have significantly contributed to its ability to adopt these principles. This shared history constitutes one of the arguments for the why the EU was created and now heralded as a unique organization, thus bringing into question again, how unique is the BSA to the EU?

As I mentioned in Chapter II, the principle of solidarity is fairly unique to the EU as an organization and provides a legal basis for sharing burdens and responsibilities. However, even without legally-binding principles of solidarity, there is evidence that people globally recognize a "sense of responsibility" to a broader global community. A 2012 Globescan survey on "Sustainable Society" found that two thirds of people surveyed answered that they personally feel a "sense of responsibility to society" (GlobeScan et al. 2012). Interestingly, only 50% of people in developed nations surveyed (Germany, UK, and US) identified with this answer compared to the 80% of people in the developing nations surveyed (China, India, and Brazil) who identified a "sense of responsibility to society." This would seem to indicate differences between Western and non-Western cultures that are associated with feeling responsible to "society," perhaps within the framework of high-context and low-context cultures -- This would require further study within which an elaboration on "society" would also be required. This indicates that while German and European history is undoubtedly unique, the idea that people have a responsibility to society is not as unique and, as a possibly vital element to the acceptance of burden sharing, could be quite generalizable as it already exists, to some extent, within the broader global community.

This section has endeavored to discuss how a sense of responsibility may be present within the global community and that it is very possibly integral to the acceptance of a burden sharing regime on the

societal level. However, I recognize the limitations of this discussion and the scope of my paper. To fully understand the level of responsibility in the global community and its necessity, further study should be completed, which I welcome. From these immediate findings, however, I posit that a sense of responsibility may well be necessary as we continually progress into a globalized world and as international issues, like climate change and peace and security, become increasingly urgent. Governments will not likely act out of a unilateral sense of responsibility so without a societal sense of responsibility, nations will perpetually act out of self-interest.

"Attribution theory tells us that feelings of guilt are linked with responsibility and motivation to act in accordance with responsibility. In this case, responsibility for the onset or offset of social inequity is likely to lead to working for social justice if guilt is associated with that responsibility" (Chizhik 2002, 296). In the case of Germany, it can be extrapolated that guilt played a role in the prevalence of feelings of responsibility however, most people do not feel guilty or responsible for the onset of social injustice others experience. How else, then, can we foster responsibility? In an examination of morality by Neckel and Wolf in their article "The Fascination of Amorality," they introduce morality as "an anthropogenically anchored and communicatively developed structure of socio-cultural forms of life, through which individuation and sociation reach a complementary relation" essentially stating that morality is a "social fact" (Neckel and Wolf 1994, 77). This indicates that human morality further separates us from "nature" despite the attempt, as illustrated in German rhetoric, to unify humans and nonhuman landscapes and lifeforms in the current ecological crisis. Furthermore, this implies that morality is not constant, that it can change depending on the "structure of socio-cultural forms." As our society continues to evolve, these socio-cultural forms will too. If morality and notions of responsibility are required to solve present-day global problems then perhaps we need to revisit these value systems in our globalized macrocosm. However, this may not require a transition away from anthropocentric morality, as we can see with the human rights and intergenerational equity arguments. In Neckel and Wolf's article, they explain Niklas Luhmann's theory that the foundation of morality is respect, "Morality denotes nothing other than 'the conditions under which people can respect or disrespect each other'" (Neckel and Wolf 1994, 80). This implies that to reach an equitable and thus sustainable global ecosystem perhaps we must first respect each other.

Addressing Solidarity

How much does the Principle of Solidarity matter for burden sharing? Within Germany, solidarity would appear to be an important factor for environmental policy within the political rhetoric. Karl

Hinrichs (1997) argues that Germany's welfare state and the function of social insurances relies on a "prevailing culture of solidarity" and "an immunity to the temptation of individual utility maximization based upon recognized moral duties which then facilitates ongoing redistributive processes" (Hinrichs 1997, 2). Based on qualitative interviews, he finds evidence that there is a culture of solidarity between Germans and social insurances cannot be explained by the pursuance of individual interests. He would argue that a culture of solidarity could help explain German motivations in burden sharing as well as within the welfare state. Tinsley and Woloshin (1974) discuss German culture as being organizational and focused on the whole, rather than on the individual. This is evident in the findings of a World Values Survey from 1995-1999 that found that 57% of Germans agreed that the government's responsibility was to 'maintain order within society' over 'respecting the freedoms on an individual,' of which only 37% agreed (World Values Survey 1999). Tinsley and Woloshin's writings would imply that German culture would more easily accept the notion of solidarity between Germans and other nations however, whether or not these sentiments transcend borders is relatively unclear outside of political rhetoric. Additionally, because their work was done in the 1970s and would not reflect a transition to post-materialist ideas in the postwar period, this does imply a prevailing culture of solidarity. However, Karl Hinrichs' work, it could be argued, actually reflects post-materialistic ideals because of its time period, and the "social insurances" he discusses are exactly the type of comfort Inglehart claims people require before promoting post-materialistic ideals. Maybe solidarity then becomes one of these ideals.

In the 2002 survey within Germany, nearly 80% of Germans surveyed said they felt either "somewhat" or "strongly" connected to their community. Similarly, 82% of Germans answered that they felt either "somewhat" or "strongly" connected to their region while more than 75% of people felt "somewhat" and "strongly" connected to the state (Election Studies (Germany) 2002). Conversely, in 2002, a survey by Election Studies (Germany) found that only about 34% of people felt "somewhat connected" to the EU community and 38.5% felt only "sparsely connected." About an equal percentage of Germans, around a tenth, felt either "strongly connected" or "not at all connected" (Election Studies (Germany) 2002). Taken together, this does illustrate that "solidarity" as a German cultural value permeates economics and its welfare state, and the environmental need to protect future generations. However, the above survey data does not point to a culture of solidarity that extends beyond Germany's borders or between Germany and the broader EU. Therefore, while the welfare state may have been bolstered by solidarity between Germans and consequently may have fed into an atmosphere of post-materialism, other factors ultimately played more of a role in Germany's decision in the BSA.

So, while solidarity could assist the creation of a system-wide BSA, is this principle necessary? In the main document of the BSA (Council of the European Union decision 2002/358/EC), solidarity is not

mentioned. However, solidarity *is* mentioned in EU founding documents with a stipulation on environmental protection. Additionally, the international community has been discussing the notion of burden sharing since the Kyoto Protocol and although it has not been successfully implemented thus far, this implies that it is still on the minds of countries outside of the EU who have not adopted legally-binding principles of solidarity. This indicates that despite EU emphasis on solidarity, this need not be a founding principle in an international burden sharing regime.

Economic and Cultural Barriers to Burden Sharing

Germany was an environmental leader in both Europe and the world before many other countries and pushed for and passed many stringent environmental policies before it was economically competitive to do so. As mentioned in the previous chapter, this was because environmentalism has been integrated into society as a legitimate aspect. In part, this was facilitated by a moral responsibility that evolved in the postwar period however, it was also due in part to Germany's economic standing and its ability to care for its citizens. During the postwar period, Germany economically rebuilt itself which included developing a social welfare system, providing a safety net and sense of security for its citizens. Ronald Inglehart argues that this is the type of environment that would facilitate post-materialistic ideals within society and a society that is more inclined to produce social change. One would think that Germany's economic standing and its ability to accept burden would be relatively easy to "export" given that other countries like the US and Japan have risen to similar standings. However, post-materialism implies that even economic powerhouses in the world would have a hard time putting environmental policies before the needs of their citizens. If citizens do not feel their basic needs are accounted for they will be less inclined to accept environmental protection as a normal, uncontroversial part of society. Therefore, despite being a potential role model for countries of similar economic standing, Germany and the EU provide a unique case in burden sharing.

It should be acknowledged that in the way that post-materialism assumes that materialist desires (desires to have basic needs met) and environmental protection do not overlap is a severe shortcoming in the theory. Climate change, water pollution, and air pollution are all examples of environmental problems that pose clear threats to the well-being of society. The issue of pollution in countries like China have prompted grassroots action, often organized through social media, demanding increased environmental reform (Bradsher 2012). Air pollution and water pollution both pose serious health threats and although the Chinese government is often focused on economic reform in an attempt to alleviate poverty, civil society has demanded increased action to combat pollution. In an effort to dampen civil discontent, the

Chinese government has taken action to try to combat pollution and climate change. China would not be considered a Post-Material society despite the significant economic gains it has experienced in the past few decades. China is not the only developing country that has made these types of reforms, and other countries that have experienced harsh effects due to climatic change are increasingly attuned to similar policies. Bangladesh has implemented a series of adaptation policies that aim to prepare coastal areas for sea level rise by building multi-story shelters for people during extreme weather and bolstering the growth of forests along the coastal belt (Ritter 2013). This implies that as climate change increasingly poses a risk to societal well-being, environmentalism will be increasingly less a post-materialist ideal and more simply a materialist one.

German culture also played a role in the widespread acceptance of the environmental movement in German society; German culture seems to possess an affinity for the German landscape, which translated into the environmental movement. In France, on the other hand, the environmental movement was defined by interest groups due to the French ideology of public interest (*intérêt général*). Various interest groups play a significant role in French politics and due to the "confrontational nature of the green social movement," it was portrayed as "unrepresentative, extremist and illegitimate" (Szarka 2002, 215). This prevented environmental policy that was widely accepted by all parties and shows that the environmental movement in France was viewed as fringe, not as a legitimate social actor. The legitimacy of the environmental movement in Germany was an important part of its acceptance and made it easier to enact environmental legislation. While German culture is obviously unique, as all cultures can claim, the reason it facilitated this legitimization is not. German culture promotes the discussion of "environment" without dichotomies and as a societal need, which is a very anthropocentric viewpoint. This allows the discussion around environmentalism to focus on the human element. As the France case indicates, to promote a widespread acceptance, environmental movements need to reframe central arguments for enacting environmental policy and societal change. When thinking about the ethics of climate change, the human rights argument is very powerful and may be increasingly relevant as climate change effects become more severe. As environmental degradation poses increased risk to civilization, this anthropocentric argument indicates that it will more easily be accepted as legitimate over time.

I have argued throughout this paper that the primary reason Germany has been such a significant leader in climate change policy has been because of this so-called "normalization" of its environmental movement, issues, and values. I would argue that this is a necessary element to make strides on any global environmental issue and is therefore a necessary element for burden sharing negotiations. Without a depoliticization of the issue, the argument will always be 'whether or not' rather than 'in what way.' The UNFCCC has exemplified this because its very formation took away the 'whether or not' climate change

was an issue, which is not true in all countries' citizen bases. The political issue then became 'in what way' will we tackle climate change and finally we see *some* agreement on these details with the Paris Agreement. However, I would argue that part of the reason this agreement has been so many years in the making is because environmental issues, such as climate change and deforestation, do not presently enjoy widespread legitimacy as a societal *need*. If they did, countries may adopt stricter national policies without the "you-first" mentality that we have seen. Both the EU and Germany have been trailblazers in this respect. So, is legitimacy of climate change a prerequisite for burden sharing? Further study on the extent to which environmental issues have been normalized within other EU countries would provide a clearer answer to this question. However, I would argue that while the implementation of burden sharing may be possible without this normalization, it would significantly help its acceptance within society thus contributing to its sustainability.

The above has sought to isolate what is unique and what is generalizable in the context of Germany and its motivations in the BSA at a societal level. When dealing with norms that are difficult to measure and quantify like I attempt to do, it is easy to speculate and hard to prove. However, this should act as a jumping off point for further discussion, and perhaps further study, of societal norms relating to burden sharing as a concept.

Implementation of Another BSA

A discussion on the exportability of the BSA would be incomplete without examining how the BSA was implemented. The primary way the EU was able to meet its Kyoto target through the BSA was by creating an EU-wide carbon trading system called the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS). The EU ETS was implemented in 2005 was the world's first and largest carbon market (Bednar-Friedl et al. 2012). It required all member states during Phase I to submit National Allocation Plans, which would dictate the number of allocations each member state would receive. The ETS has gone through three stages thus far, with the intention of lowering the "cap" of the cap and trade system in each phase. During Phase I (2005-2007) the emission allowances allocations were free and relatively lenient, with the intention of becoming more strict and auctioning off a portion of them during Phase II (2008-2012). Phase III (2013-2020) required a larger section of the allowances be auctioned and with 100% of the allowances in the power sector auctioned (Bednar-Friedl et al. 2012). These phases were intended to limit the financial impact of the ETS by gradual implementation (Knight 2011).

The ETS, as the first one of its kind, has undergone substantial criticism and has therefore been consistently revised in each phase. For example, in 2006 the EU allocated an excess of permits, which

caused the price of carbon to drop to near-zero. For obvious reasons this counteracts what the ETS is attempting to do by disincentivizing businesses and countries to invest in low-carbon technologies and work towards limiting their emissions. The primary reason for the oversight was a lack of a successful monitoring system, which caused the European Commission to overestimate the cap and the amount of permits needed to meet their goal (Knight 2011). This problem has since been addressed. Another common criticism with the EU ETS is carbon leakage. As polluting industries relocate to areas that are not monitored under the ETS but are still supplying to areas within, this falsely reports lower emissions within the EU when the emissions have simply moved to other places in Europe. This is a major issue with any national or regional carbon market and is something that is being addressed with time. Despite being an evolving, imperfect system, the EU ETS has acted as a model for many other countries.

One of the long-term goals of the ETS is to one day be able to link up national and regional markets to create an international carbon market (European Commission 2016). It has worked towards this goal by providing a model for other areas, including the State of New York. National and sub-national cap and trade systems are also already underway in Canada, Kazakhstan, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland and the United States and are planned in Brazil, Chile, China, Mexico, and South Korea, Turkey, and Ukraine (DEHSt 2016). The first linking of a carbon market happened between the State of California and the Canadian State of Quebec, launched in 2014. Ontario announced in 2015 that it has plans to join this linkage in the near future (Reuters 2015). The EU also has plans to link up markets with Switzerland's carbon market in the near future.

Another regional, or perhaps international BSA, would require mechanisms like a carbon market to meet its goal. Each country would be required to have a national climate change plan, similar to what was required at the Paris talks in December with the INDCs, however, without a carbon market and other mechanisms it would be very difficult for countries to meet their goals as many industries do business globally. As the EU ETS has illustrated, it was created with the intention of facilitating a global market. Therefore, not only would it work on an international scale, as it already has, but a global carbon market would also actually make it more efficient. This would alleviate carbon leakage as well as make the price of carbon more stable by increasing market liquidity (DEHSt 2016). Another mechanism to abate emissions is a carbon tax, like British Columbia in Canada has implemented. In theory, this serves as another way to reach emissions targets and can actually be much more quickly implemented. For a burden sharing agreement or a "bubble" agreement, cap and trade is more feasible than a carbon tax because a tax may be harder to impose across borders. Both systems would require significant infrastructure in place, but the implementation of other carbon markets around the world illustrates that this is not impossible, which implies that it could be feasibly implemented in another BSA.

Another BSA would require substantial infrastructure and investment from member states. To successfully implement carbon markets and other mechanisms for addressing climate change, infrastructure will be imperative. The UNFCCC Technology Mechanism consists of a governance, a policy, and an implementation arm. Another burden sharing scheme would work most efficiently if infrastructure like this was established. However, this would require significantly more investment and delegation than states currently commit to the UNFCCC. Even if a BSA was within the bounds of a *current* regional organization, it would still require additional funds and countries would need to be willing to assign delegates to act on their behalf. Current climate negotiations are annual and often the Heads of State are directly involved. During the EU burden sharing negotiations, representatives from each state negotiated on behalf of their state, backed by the confidence of the Heads of State despite the lack of their presence in the actual negotiating room. These meetings also happened several times over the course of a year. A successful burden sharing system would require more investment in time and confidence as well as money, as the EU model shows. As the effects of climate change increasingly present themselves and become more severe, it may be easier to convince countries that this is necessary. However, as discussed, a societal will and push to accept a system like this would greatly increase the political will to establish another burden sharing agreement.

As alluded to throughout this paper, another BSA could result in either an international or a regional burden sharing agreement. As Kyoto allows under their “bubble” agreement section, groups of countries could form their own burden sharing regime. This could, but would not be required to, be regional in geography. As Aidt and Greiner write, “This regional grouping has the advantage that national particularities can be taken into account more appropriately and differentiated obligations can be negotiated. With the number of negotiating parties reduced differing interests become easier to handle” (Aidt and Greiner 2002, 20). The negotiations that take place within the UNFCCC have shown that it is very challenging to come to a unanimous agreement, as the UNFCCC requires, to pass legislation. A regional agreement would ameliorate some of these difficulties by not only making negotiations smoother and more efficient but it could also be more attentive to adaptation efforts and vulnerabilities within a geographic region. As a way to assist all countries to meet their INDCs proposed in Paris, more regional BSAs could be the next step.

Chapter V

Conclusion

This paper endeavored to identify norms and values within Germany that contributed to a feeling of responsibility to other nations and an obligation to take on more burden within the context of the EU BSA. It's clear that values did play a key role, however, other factors were at play including aspects of German culture and Germany's economic capability. Together these factors contributed to a greening of German society, which progressed through the 1980s and 90s. The widespread acceptance of the environmental movement manifested itself through many spheres of German society through this time including in the institutionalization of the environmental movement. Although I found a prevailing notion of responsibility within Germany, I did not find a prevailing culture of solidarity which the Principle of Solidarity suggested. Moreover, these values of responsibility also seem to be present outside of Germany. Responsibility, then, as a necessary value for burden sharing, is generalizable to some extent which makes the BSA generalizable as well. Germany's economic standing and its capabilities as a social welfare state make it conducive to post-materialist values which facilitated the legitimization of environmentalism. Post-materialism has been applied to many countries besides Germany and while German culture is unique, the cultural aspects for why environmental values became legitimized are generalizable as well. All nations and groups of people have a unique history and set of circumstances and, as we see with France, their environmental movements will present themselves in many different ways. What was interesting about Germany is that these primary aspects -- culture, economic standing, sense of responsibility -- led to a widespread social acceptance of what are considered environmental issues, which can really be called societal issues. This culminated in Germany taking a leadership role on climate policy during the 1990s, including in burden sharing. This widespread acceptance across societies may very well be necessary for a burden sharing agreement. This makes it difficult to know with certainty how exportable the BSA is. However, aspects of Germany's motivations -- its economic standing, anthropocentric view on the issues, and even its sense of responsibility -- can be extended outside of Germany. From this, I argue that the burden sharing agreement *is* exportable, despite the challenge in its possible implementation.

In sum, the above indicates that burden sharing could be implemented on a global or regional scale. A burden sharing regime would help rectify ideas of fairness within the international community by

allowing countries to develop while also requiring countries with historic responsibility for emissions to limit by an equitable amount. As we have seen with Paris, many countries are not opposed to agreeing to cut emissions as long as there is international cooperation. However, current attempts to address fairness within the international climate regime do not adequately address mitigation efforts. Without mitigation efforts, it will be much harder to slow atmospheric climate change. A regional or international burden sharing agreement would ensure cooperation and fair distributions while also addressing mitigation. The EU burden sharing agreement consists of developed nations, which is why it is difficult to justify exporting this system to other parts of the world as mitigation efforts in developing countries are justifiably less extensive. However, a burden sharing system could also incorporate adaptation, technology transfer, and climate finance mechanisms in order to continue to address the needs of developing nations as well as mitigation efforts. In practice a burden sharing regime will require infrastructure and mechanisms. The EU BSA was enacted in tandem with the ETS, and EU member states established their own national climate mitigation and adaptation plans. This aspect of the BSA is easily exportable as it has already been exported to other parts of the world. Similarly, an international BSA would need the infrastructure to successfully implement mechanisms, monitoring systems, and possibly a bureaucracy for a regional organization that would oversee the BSA. While this would take time and money, it's not infeasible.

Then there is the issue of responsibility. As we progress into an increasingly globalized society, we will need to determine new values concerning to whom and how much we have a responsibility for people we have never met. This puts into question certain moral sentiments, like the ones illustrated in the German case. In many ways, globalization has exposed new challenges to peace and security like terrorism and cyber security. Climate change is one of these new challenges as well and we, as society, will need to meet it by cooperating with each other. This paper has exposed one way responsibility developed in a country and as we have seen, responsibility to society does exist elsewhere in the world. Every person possesses their own unique history, which contributes to how they perceive their personal responsibility and contribution to society. The international community can move towards rectifying ethical divides by bolstering a feeling of responsibility to a global society where everyone feels they have a chance to live and thrive, and therefore wants to contribute. This will also facilitate a more sustainable society that addresses social equity, economic growth, and ecological integrity. As an increasingly global society we need to consider how we can bolster a sense of responsibility to one another to address fairness and inequality within the international system.

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