

# A Colonial Legacy in a Nutshell: How French Influence Persists in Agricultural Industries of Senegal

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## **Abstract**

This paper examines how French influence persists through trade policy in the agricultural industries of groundnuts and millet in Senegal. Senegal became independent from France in 1960, but several French institutions persist there, including the groundnut industry. This paper aims to examine how trade policy may influence a country's decision to focus on export commodities such as groundnuts over domestic goods such as millet. Even though trade policy is only one factor in commercial agricultural production it is important to examine how it might promote imperial interests and undermine former colonies' economic and political autonomy. This study will try to determine if export commodities are promoted in Senegal and how trends in international trade policies hinder or bolster the two industries of groundnuts and millet. Confronting this postcolonial power dynamic will help us understand factors concerning global inequities that are promoted by international institutions.

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## **Definitions and Abbreviations:**

- International Political Economy- The study of how politics shape development in the global economy and how global economy shapes politics.
  
- Bretton Woods Institutions- i.e. the IMF, ITO and World Bank. Established the rules for international institutions after World War II. Strong focus on international interconnectedness and a return to liberalization and free trade.
  
- IMF- The International Monetary Fund. Role is to monitor member countries' macroeconomic policies and act as a lender of last resort in times of crisis.
  
- ITO- The International Trade Organization. A proposed Bretton Woods institution that would negotiate international trade rules, but its charter was never passed by the U.S. Congress.
  
- Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs)- A set of economic policies that are conditions for receiving a loan from the IMF. They are often based on free-market policies such as deregulation, privatization, and balanced budgets.
  
- World Bank- An international institution that provides loans for developing countries' capital programs.
  
- Gold Standard (GS)- a monetary system in which a state cannot print more money than it has in its bank (within certain parameters).
  
- World Trade Organization (WTO)- An international governmental institution that regulates global trade.
  
- Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)- A United Nations agency that works on alleviating world hunger through agriculture education and research.
  
- Neoliberalism- An ideology based on neoclassical economics that favors supply-side and free-market principles that promote a movement of capital from the public to the private sector.
  
- Postcolonialism- The condition of a former colonial country and a theoretical framework devoted to studying the effects of colonialism in former colonies.

- Global North/Developed/Core/Imperial states- Usually defined as a country that has an economy and technology that are highly 'developed' compared to other states. Most of these countries are in the Global North including most of Western Europe, the U.S. and Japan.

- Global South/Developing/Periphery/Colonized states- Any country that is not a developed country, these include most of Africa, parts of Asia and Eastern Europe as well as Latin America. The economies and technologies in these countries are not as developed relative to the Global North.

- Groundnuts (GN)- The commodity name for the peanut. Groundnuts are called as such because they grow from legumes as opposed to tree nuts.

- Millet- A fast-growing grain that is usually grown in warm climates that have poor soils. It contains more nutrients than rice or wheat and is more or less native to West Africa.

## 1. Introduction:

### **1.1. Global Power is Dynamic and Multifaceted**

How global power is situated is a hotly-debated topic. Some, such as economist Thomas Piketty argue that global power is situated not in states, but in the global elites and offshore bank accounts (Piketty 2014). Others argue that global power is situated within the most militarized countries of the world, which intimidate and secure power through threat of war (Mearsheimer 2010). Or, according to some, power is actually concentrated among those countries who have cultural capital and influence politics through norms and ideals (Nye 2004). No matter how a state stands on how power is situated, almost every one of them would like to be in a position of power and those that have it now are doing their best to hold onto it, as we can see in nationalistic movements that have taken over the world from the United States to Latin America to Europe. Movements such as these are often seen in times of unrest and world-wide changes of power (Zasllove 2011). Where this power lies in the world, in what moment in time and in whose hands it is wielded is a subject that entire disciplines are dedicated to studying. In what ways can we begin to unpack such a loaded and complicated subject? Dynamics of power do not usually appear out of nowhere, nor do they last forever. This being said, one must begin to wonder where and when global political dynamics originate and how they play out over a period of time.

There are endless examples of imbalanced power dynamics that we could study. One pervasive power dynamic is that of colonial and postcolonial relationships and how this dynamic may persist even seventy years after many colonies won their independence. The ways that this dynamic plays out is not always transparent, but is still present in nuanced and

structural ways. There are several long-lasting ties between former imperial and colonial states that are concrete, including language, constitutions, education and trade. For example, Indian education is primarily in English and one aspect of social class is one's ability to communicate in the English language (Chavan 2013). Who benefits from these existing postcolonial power structures? Postcolonial countries, particularly those in Africa are often the subjects of development strategy and are also some of the poorest countries in world. When we talk about these countries, the burden of development is often cast onto the country itself and not onto other entities that may have contributed to their instability (Stiglitz 2003). The lack of contextualization in development politics ignores historical and unique colonial experiences that may still have effects today. Thus, I argue that to comprehensively study the development and conditions of postcolonial countries, including and especially concerning those in Africa, one must also examine their colonial relationship and any lasting ties between the postcolonial state and its colonizer.

How can we study such relationships and in what forms do power dynamics play out? One way to investigate how power plays out and transforms in the global arena is through the study of international political economy, a field that concerns the "enduring political battle between winners and losers of global economic exchange" (Oatley 2015). We can track relationships of power through economic policies and trends and also discuss how political economic power influences international economic policies. This way of looking at geopolitical power is particularly relevant in today as war is often waged through economic means rather than military might (Clemens 2013). States and even individuals have the power to bring down another country through a rumor, a speculative attack, or an isolationist approach to trade.



The United States has often waged war through economic means: during the Cold War, in Cuba, and soon possibly in Mexico as President Trump plans to raise tariffs for Mexican imports to the U.S. With concrete examples in mind, once we combine the study of international political economy with the power dynamic between postcolonial and imperial states, one can begin to see patterns between development and imperial/Western economic institutions. While these countries may no longer be colonies, through economic policy and global norms former imperial states can still wield power over them.

#### 1.1.1. Framing Questions

My research is based broadly in postcolonial legacies and in what ways they manifest themselves today. The questions that guided my study were; even though postcolonial countries are no longer colonies, do their colonizers still influence their day-to-day life? If these relationships do exist today, to what extent do they persist and within what forms? And finally, who benefits from existing colonial power structures today? These questions led me to the field of International Political Economy where I founded my inquiries in theory.

#### 1.1.2. Focus Questions/Hypothesis

While keeping my broader questions about colonial legacies in mind, I am seeking to find a concrete answer as to how have French influence and policies since the colonial period affected the industries of groundnuts and millet in Senegal? And further, are export-based agricultural industries or domestic ones promoted in a post-colonial trade arena? I hypothesize that colonial influence still exists in several forms, including within economic industries and policies. Further, I conjecture that economic policy created by international organizations and previous imperial powers would show a trend of promotion of export industries through low

import tariffs and preferential trade deals with former colonies. This trend would explain a prolonged dependence by post-colonial countries for economic stability and income and therefore, imperial countries are able to maintain cheap imports while post-colonial growth is stagnated by the status-quo. These countries feel a pressure to focus on internationally-oriented industries, limiting the expansion of domestically-focused ones.

### 1.1.3. Road Map:

In this paper, I will argue that Northern/imperial states exercise their economic influence through trade policy and that these policies constrain the economic autonomy and growth of the Global South. I will demonstrate this influence through the imperial/colonial relationship of France to Senegal from 1930-present day. I will explore how French influence presides over institutions in Senegal by studying two agricultural industries, groundnuts and millet, and how these two industries have developed over the period of study. From my research, I argue that colonial influence still exists in several forms, including within economic industries and policies. To further this point, I argue that after World War II liberal trends in the global economy provided open “free” markets for groundnut exports, but protectionist policies that France put in place to bolster the industry were dropped. This double movement created at the same time incentives for Senegal to export in the free market, but with less capital from France to do so.

I will present my case as follows: first I will discuss my broader, guiding questions in my research that we will keep in mind for the duration of this paper. After, I will ground my inquiries in theory and general ideas in the topic of post-colonial relations. Then, I will provide some brief background on the period of colonization in West Africa, the motivations behind

colonization and different countries' approach to colonial administration. In addition, I will also outline thematic periods in trade policy during 1930-today and what ideas were in vogue and who advocated those ideas. I will also briefly discuss other research that has been done on my topic and what my research will add to the field. After I outline the issue of colonial influence and trade policy, I will present Senegal's unique experience with colonization and its current agricultural and economic situation. Then, I will dive into my methods and data that I collected for this study. I will discuss my analysis and how it can apply to other situations and aid in understanding modern conditions of agriculture and industry in Senegal.

## **1.2. Theory**

To address my broader questions, I turned to the discipline of International Political Economy and looked specifically into how International Political Economists research unequal power dynamics and postcolonial relationships. Several international political economists use World Systems Analysis to help explain how international/colonial power structures come about and how they persist in economic relations including trade. World Systems Theory can be used as the international affairs counterpart to the literary lens of postcolonialism which studies colonial legacies through the literature of colonized peoples. The postcolonial lens was my jumping off point into studying post-colonial legacies in French Studies.

World Systems Theory/Analysis is a way to study differences of state development throughout the globe. The main tenet of World Systems Analysis, developed by sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein in the mid 1970s, is that there is a hierarchy of power between "core" and "periphery" nations in which the core states economically exploit and oppress the weaker periphery nations (Chase-Dunn & Grimes 1995). The core or developed nations use their

economic leverage to constrain the development of periphery of developing nations. This is not always intentional: the idea of the framework is that a system has been created and that states continue to operate within this system not always realizing that they are affecting others. This analysis critiques capitalism and global liberalism for the ways they bolster already powerful countries and burden ones that are trying to make a place for themselves in the international arena.

World Systems Analysis fits into a discussion of postcolonial relationships because it incorporates the modern global system and the inequalities inherently present within. I applied this framework to my study also because it does not put an emphasis on “underdevelopment” or “development” as primary issues or goals and does not assume a single path to the Global North’s conception of development (Wallerstein 1987). It is important to make this distinction because a single goal of development validates the civilizing mission inherent to imperialism. In studying a postcolonial relationship, I do not want to imply that Senegal should move towards a single goal of development or return to its pre-colonial systems. My research is in establishing and following one postcolonial relationship, not to make prescriptions for Senegalese agriculture. Using World Systems Analysis, with special attention to postcolonial power dynamics will help guide my study and establish how unequal power dynamics play out in different ways in the international arena.

### **1.3. Background:**

### **1.4. The Age of Imperialism and West Africa**

The age of imperialism in West Africa originated in the early 1800s, as European countries were looking to expand their economies through new business ventures and amass

power through acquisition of land (Crowder 1968). European powers saw Africa as a blank slate and a wealth of resources and as a tool for the liberal state of the 19th century to amass more wealth for its business class at home (Polyani 1944). Thus, European states started to race each other to occupy tracts of lands they deemed “undeveloped” to amass more and more resources and market opportunities for their citizens. This culminated in the Berlin Conference of 1884 where some basic rules were established for the partition of West Africa (Crowder 1968). To set the stage for this period of colonization, I will discuss the political/economic environment of the time.

The 19th century, The Age of Imperialism, is marked by global peace explained through the study of international economy. Relative peace during this era was maintained by two

economic and two political institutions which worked in concert: the market system and the gold standard (economic) as well as the liberal state and the balance of powers (political)

**Figure 1. Map of Colonial Holdings in West Africa, *The Metropolitan Museum of Art.***

(Polyani 1944). The market system during the 19th century was about



allowing the state to amass wealth through a new business class, *haute finance*, and the

promotion of risk-oriented capitalism in place of mercantilism which prioritized the domestic institutions over free trade (Eichengreen 2008). The gold standard was an effort by Great Britain to globalize the market system through currency backed by gold. The gold standard relied on a global balance of trade because one state cannot take spend more money than they have in gold, thus each state must keep export and import levels balanced with each other in order for the system to function (Eichengreen 2008). Because of this transition towards a capitalist/trade oriented economy from domestic-oriented mercantilism, states and the business class needed secure international relations and a global balance of power. This balance of power was maintained by the liberal state because during the 19th century the state's only duty was to let its citizens amass wealth (Polanyi 1944). *Haute finance* funded this peace because world war would be more costly to them by disrupting the open trade they relied on. Thus, this combination of factors maintained peace and stability right after a time when peace was not the norm.

The age of imperialism is an example of the institution of balance of power as it consisted of each state balancing each other's power by claiming more and more land around the world. Within West Africa, Britain and France were the most influential players, over Germany and Portugal who also had colonies there (Crowder 1968). For the French, acquisition of land was militaristic and based on quantity over quality; explaining the overwhelming amount of desert land in French occupation of West Africa. Britain, on the other hand, did not want to expend the huge amounts of money needed for military maneuvers so it focused its efforts on amassing territory with abundant natural and economic resources, leaving the state with less land, but more concentrated capital (Figure 1). As colonizing powers, Britain and

France had very different approaches in governing their territories and the people that lived there. These differences are important to study because they help to explain how the relationships between the imperial power and the colony evolved over time and why countries have had different experiences adapting to independence after the colonial period. Due to the length and scope of this study, I will be making some generalizations with respect to colonial history and administration. My goal in outlining the major characteristics of British and French colonial rule is to highlight definitive differences in governmental style and imperial attachment and investment in colonies of West Africa.

#### 1.4.1. Britain as a Colonial Administrator:

Britain initially pursued a policy of indirect rule over its colonies; indirect rule being the government of a colony through the institutions of the colony itself. The argument for indirect rule is that Europe and Africa are culturally distinct and that European institutions might not be the best means of governing African peoples (Crowder 1968). Administrators of indirect rule instead modified existing institutions so that they would achieve what European powers think of as *good government* and so that they would achieve the economic goal of exploiting the colony for European interests. Britain aimed to implement this form of government in its colonies, but found that it tended to be ineffective in practice and eventually adopted a more paternalistic approach to colonial government. However, much of British rule is categorized within indirect rule. Great Britain established far fewer administrators for many more people in its colonies than France (Berry 1992). These administrators also tended to be distant from their constituents both in location and position; they lived far from town and did not interact with the people that they governed (Crowder 1968). Distance and tensions augmented between

traditional rulers who were not allowed to climb up the administrative ladder and the administrator who, by alienating these rulers, enforced and encouraged the people's demand for increased participation in government (Firmin-Sellers 2000). Therefore, without the support of colonial governments or financial support from Britain, administration in British colonies mainly took on the role of advisement, leaving direct rule up to the modified African institutions.

#### 1.4.2. France and *Colonisation Indigène*:

The West African colonies of France include Senegal, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Guinea, the Côte d'Ivoire, Dahomey, upper Volta and Togo. The French 'style' of colony government took on a much more centralized, direct approach than that of the British. This difference is important as my study focuses on a uniquely French post-colonial relationship and why that relationship might differ from another imperial country's interactions with a former colony. The French colonial project was formally named *colonisation indigène* or native colonization (van Beusekom 2002). This program was built on the belief that by applying French culture, language, education, and technology a colony would develop to the French level and become nearly French (Crowder 1968). Thus, the French adopted an administrative policy of assimilation where they asserted that if given the opportunity all humans *could* be equal, including those in West Africa, and could be given the privilege of French citizenship if they climbed up the administrative ladder (Geschiere 1993). To carry out this approach the French replaced traditional chiefs with people they deemed would be loyal to them and broke down large political units into uniformly smaller ones (Huillery 2009). This required a massive movement and breakdown of traditional societal structures, very different to the modified



status quo of British administration. The result was an unstable society, members of which could be given French citizenship and could be elected to governmental positions, but that was deeply divided and stripped of its culture (van Beusekom 2002). This disruption may have also limited collective action after independence because the peoples of French colonies were so dispersed and lacked the cohesion of their previous cultural structure.

### **1.5. 20th Century International Economic Periods**

Now that we have outlined the period of colonization in West Africa, we will now turn to a brief background in thematic periods of international trade policy, as outlined in the discipline of International Political Economy (IPE). According to IPE, there are five major periods of international economic policy since 1930: the interwar period (1914-1944), Bretton-Woods liberalism (1945-1974), post-Bretton Woods new ideas (1975-1994), the third wave of globalization (1995-2008) and the modern period which has yet to be named (2008-?). Each period has its own characteristics, but there are some patterns in ideas and policies that one can begin to see. In each period I will particularly highlight colonies' role in the period as their position is essential to my research.

The first period that takes place within my time period of study is the interwar period from 1914-1944. This period in IPE is often called Interwar Instability because of the upset in the concentration of international power after Great Britain's fall from global hegemony and states' responses to this new world order (Polyani 1944). The interwar period is characterized by high inflation, mercantilism, American isolationism and the Great Depression (Block 1977). Because of economic debt and instability following World War I many states turned inwards and prioritized their domestic economies over international stability. Thus, trade policies during

this period fall under the realm of mercantilism, where states try to increase their wealth to gain power (Oatley 2015). This played out in imperial/colonial relationships as imperial states concentrated their wealth in colonial blocks; prioritizing domestic goods and goods produced by their colonial states. Any goods outside this block would be taxed in the form of tariffs or duties, limiting international trade. This system and colonial institutions gave precedence to commodity goods in colonial agriculture, as there was a reliable market and demands for these goods to be produced.

The second period of investigation is the Bretton Woods Era from 1945-1974. After World War II, international politics turned towards global cooperation and increased dependency on international relations. The institutions created at Bretton-Woods (the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund) were a hallmark of open, liberal trade, American hegemony and monetary stability that lasted in some form until 1974 (Oatley 2015). The World Bank was created with economic development of developing countries in mind and delegates from the Global South were vocal and very present at the meeting of Bretton-Woods (Helleiner 2014). To what extent their voices were heard after the initial meetings is questionable and many argue that their interests were abandoned shortly after (Helleiner 2014). In this period tariffs and protectionist measures were dropped globally and international trade was at its highest since before World War I (Oatley 2015). This period can be thought of as a reactionary response to the turmoil of the 1920s and 1930s as well as a recognition of global interdependence.

In 1974 this system collapsed after Richard Nixon went off the Gold Standard because of increasing speculation on the dollar and its convertibility (ability to be exchanged for gold). The

Bretton-Woods system relied on the United States as a keeper of international currency stability because it was the only country to reliably adhere to the Gold Standard, on which the IMF and World Bank operated (Oatley 2015). Once America came off the Gold Standard, this system collapsed and regions began to divide themselves into trading blocs such as the European Economic Community (EEC) and the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA) (Gilpin 1987). Regional division followed the fall of Bretton Woods as countries were looking for smaller outlets for trade and unity, believing that American hegemony over the system is what brought it down in the first place (Gilpin 1987). However, some countries were left out of these blocs and global trade suffered once again. Because most colonies gained freedom before this period, they no longer had the stability of imperial trading blocs, though many of the institutions developed during colonization were still in place.

New ideas emerged during the post-Bretton Woods period which led to a third period of globalization from 1994-2008. International trade policy during this period was influenced by the Washington Consensus developed in 1989 by English economist, John Williamson, in Washington D.C. (Stiglitz 2002). The Washington Consensus packaged the ideas of supply-side economics (i.e. Reaganomics, Trickle-down economics) which advocated for tax cuts for the wealthy and a broad cut-back of government programs and involvement in the economy. The institutions that were influenced by the Consensus, such as the IMF, prescribed them for all other countries in the world. In Joseph Stiglitz's book on the International Monetary Fund and its role in global development, *Globalization and Its Discontents*, he critiques the consensus and how institutions like the IMF use their ideas to justify policy that may not be effective for every country. International policy during prioritized balanced budgets, tax cuts for the wealthy, low

interest rates, open trade and immense deregulation of industry (Stiglitz 2002). This is often called the “race to the bottom” where states competed to make their country the most favorable to outside businesses by lowering regulations and barriers to entry in their markets. The main consequence of these policies was that developing states could not invest in vital industries such as hospitals, education, or agriculture because they had to balance their budgets in order to receive funds from the IMF. Total openness in trade and business also destabilized the economies of the loan recipient states as they were vulnerable to the volatile prices and speculative sentiments of the international arena. This era of globalization crashed in 2008 among the housing crisis in the U.S. and global financial instability.

Since 2008 we have been in a unclassified era of International Political Economy, but so far it seems to be in line with the cyclical pattern of protectionism and isolationism of post globalization eras. States are beginning to turn inwards once again or turn towards regional blocs, Britain’s exit from the EU (or Brexit) of summer 2016 and the election of populist Donald Trump in the U.S. are examples of this trend. What effect this wave of anti-globalism will have on the Global South is unclear; regional blocs may become stronger and less developed states may turn towards producing more domestically consumed goods than export commodities for the Global North. Another outcome may be that increased tariffs and protectionist measures by industrialized states will strain the fragile economies of developing countries, as they are required to maintain open trade to receive funds from the IMF. It is unclear when this era will end. In any case it will be interesting to see what international economists name it after it is finished.

### 1.6. How has this been studied?

As one can imagine, there is a plethora of research and study on periphery economies in relation to core nations in the Global North. My research was mainly conducted on studies in West Africa, more specifically in Senegal and on its agricultural industries. As I conducted my research I realized that many of the studies focus on issues within the domestic government, (including those of Masters and Mbaye) and the development of these industries and not on a possible enduring relationship between France/EU and Senegal. These studies did of course acknowledge effects that colonization may have had on the modern structure of Senegalese institutions, but there is not much discussion on *how* these structures persist and what forms of power may exist between Senegal and France today. One study that I used throughout my research was a thesis by Eberechukwu Akobundu in which he studied the effects of state policy on groundnut farmers in Senegal (Akobundu 1998). While he shows a vital aspect of the government's role in the agricultural sector and the effects state policy has on individuals, he does not delve into the *why* of these policies and what actors were behind their formation. Political economist Carlos Oya does delve into this *why* in his study of the effects of Structural Adjustment Programs on the groundnut sector, but his study concerns only groundnuts and not the performance of other crops, such as millet (Oya 2001).

Some studies I researched were more generally on the economic performance of former colonial states and how imperialism may have affected performance. This includes economist Elise Huillery's 2011 essay on the relative performance of former French West-African states. She argues in her study that highly-European settled and less-hostile areas of French West Africa perform better economically than those that were more hostile and poorly-settled. While

this is an interesting aspect of colonial influence, it does not discuss the post-colonial influence of France on its former colonies. It assumes that French institutions in highly-settled areas set them up for success after independence, while not delving into a modern relationship between imperialist and colony.

Going off the thread of time, many of the studies I found discussed agriculture in Senegal, but situated themselves in a snapshot of time; there was contextualization of the colonial era in the introduction, but not in the research itself. I wanted to develop a study that would span the end of the colonial era. I was most interested in following a relationship and studying how it has changed over time through the lens of a specific industry. The fact that I look at both the industries of groundnuts and millet is not unique, however; I found multiple studies where researchers studied both industries such as John Gray's comprehensive study on price and policy changes of agricultural industries in Senegal (Gray 2002). But, he again focuses on domestic rather than international policy as factors behind performance. My study is on a more macro-international level than the studies I gathered on agriculture in Senegal and I am looking to enhance and add to this field of research by studying this aspect.

## 2. Senegalese Agriculture and French Trade: A Situated Approach

### **2.1. Situated Context of Senegal and France**

Now that we have laid the groundwork for my study, we can zoom into Senegal and its unique colonial experience. Fundamentally, my research is situated in the Senegalese agricultural industries of groundnuts (an export commodity) and millet (a domestically consumed product). Temporally and conceptually it is situated within the influence of French and European Union trade policies from 1930-onward. Moving forward, this part of my study

will contain a brief background on Senegal and its history, the methods of my study and the results of my research.

## **2.2. A brief history of Senegal**

Senegal is an independent state in West Africa that is home to approximately 14.5 million people, of whom over half (8 million) live in rural areas (FAO 2014). Senegal is also the first French colony in West Africa and was home to the French colonial capital of the Afrique Occidentale Française (AOF) in Dakar. The climate is tropical, with distinct wet and dry seasons and the state has a western oceanic border. Senegal was colonized by French imperialists starting in the early 1800s, becoming a permanent French possession in 1840 (Nelson 1974). As stated previously, the French adopted an assimilative approach to colonial administration, seeking to assimilate colonized peoples by introducing French cultural institutions, scientific and educational practices and the French language, among others. The program of assimilation required a lot of participation and many French bodies to create these institutions which, needs that were not always met to carry out the program. However, as Senegal was the hub of French colonial Africa and one of its first colonial “projects,” French assimilation policy was strongly pursued there (Nelson 1974). Senegal spent 120 years as a French colony until April 1960 when it won its independence among most other former colonies in Africa. There are multiple institutions that were developed in Senegal during its period as a colony, but as my study concerns agriculture industries, I will only be focusing on that aspect of the French colonial regime.

### 2.2.1. Colonial agricultural programs

Agricultural production was a central part of colonial administration. A driving factor of colonization was the amassing of resources abroad that could be shipped back to the home country at cheaper prices and larger quantities. However, many West African countries, including Senegal, did not have the intensive agricultural systems in place that characterize much of European agriculture (van Beusekom 2002). Senegalese peoples practiced mainly *extensive* agriculture before colonization (van Beusekom 2002). The difference between the two is that extensive agriculture is highly mobile, as every few years farmers plant their crops in different areas. It is often described as “slash and burn” agriculture because farmers would burn down the vegetation in each new planting area. European intensive agriculture is highly immobile, but requires a much deeper working of the land through plows and soil turnover. The French did not like extensive agriculture for several reasons: first, they saw it as highly destructive because it requires the burning of forested areas and second, because it is significantly more difficult to control agricultural labor when it is mobile. Thus, the French instituted their system of intensive agricultural practices (van Beusekom 2002).

The role of the French government in colonial agriculture was, as stated by French colonial Governor Roger, to “conduct agricultural research , provide economic incentives encouraging private farmers to increase productivity, provide monetary advances for equipment and animals, distribute seeds and plants free of charge, give food aid in the hungry season, offer farmer training by government agents, and finance community improvements (wells, dikes, village fences, etc.).” (Kelly et al 1996). In Senegal specifically, agriculture was centered around the groundnut. The government heavily taxed farmers that produced crops



other than groundnuts so that they essentially had to work planting groundnuts instead of their own food (van Beusekom 2002). The government also heavily subsidized groundnut seed and other inputs/credits to incentivize its production. Government intervention worked in making Senegal a powerhouse of groundnut production; during the interwar period Senegal was the top exporter of groundnuts in the world, making up 85 percent of all groundnut exports (Bonneuil 1999). The French made Senegal into a highly specialized country through groundnut production which partially explains why ties to this industry are difficult to break. Because its implementation required a transformation of culture, another cultural transformation may have to occur for this system to be changed.

After independence in 1960, this system of agricultural exports was still in place, but without French support through input subsidies and tax credits (Kelly et al 1996). The lack of gradual transition from colonial to independent government strained the farmers who worked on the fields as they relied on the French system for their livelihood (van Beusekom 2002). The departure of the French required construction of new trading houses for groundnuts, new methods of paying for inputs and renting equipment and new demands for sources of income that was no longer being met through colonial government. The Senegalese government took on this role and after independence there was a period of nationalization and socialism during which the government tried to continue giving support to farmers (Masters 2007). While independence was hard fought and hard won, the road to rebuilding systems and institutions once free was difficult as well.

### 2.2.2. Agriculture in Senegal today

Today, not much has drastically changed since independence in the agriculture of Senegal. Groundnuts are still one of the largest agricultural products and a major export. Rice has also become a popular agricultural product, but its global price has been decreasing in recent years relative to millet which has actually increased in price since 1960 (Masters 2007). This is probably due to the nature of millet as it is mainly consumed in rural and remote areas and is a specialty crop. Senegal has a large balance of payment deficit which means that it imports far more in goods than it exports, a legacy of the French system of imports for national food supply (OEC 2014). With market-oriented pressure from international institutions such as the IMF, the Senegalese government has been slowly removing support for farmers through subsidies and credit for machinery (Kelly et al 1996). Stress on agricultural land has also started to manifest after decades of intensive monocropping and deforestation (Mbow et al 2008). My analysis addresses the evolution towards this agricultural environment through French trade policy towards which we will turn now.

### **2.3. Data and Methodology**

My methodology is three-pronged to address each aspect of my questions. The first part of my methods concerns collection of data on the industries of groundnuts and millet and graphical visualizations of how each has developed over time. The second part of my methodology is concerned with grouping eras of French-related trade policy into a comprehensive timeline. The third part of my methodology aims to establish the groundnut trade relationship between France and Senegal through a collection of data on the top

groundnut importer countries . I will justify the metrics and policies chosen and then discuss how I carried out my research.

### 2.3.1. Justification for chosen metrics

First I would like to justify my choice to focus on groundnuts and millet in Senegal. I specifically chose to compare the evolution of groundnuts and millet because the former is primarily an export crop and was introduced to Senegalese production by the French and the latter is a more traditional domestic/locally consumed crop that is more or less native to West Africa (Havinden 1970). I chose to compare an export commodity and a domestic crop because export crops were promoted over locally consumed produce during the colonial era (van Beusekom 2002). Rather than diverting local labor from commodity production to subsistence, the French developed a system of commodities where rice that was produced more cheaply in Vietnam was shipped to colonies in Africa. (van Beusekom 2002). Thus, indigenous grains such as millet were not as widely produced as they were before the colonial period. Essentially, I chose ground nuts and millet because they represent a dichotomy between European and African interests in what crops local people should be producing. And, if over time we see that groundnuts still dominate over millet it might be an indication of lasting imperial influence over agriculture because the French institution of groundnut monoculture still takes precedence over indigenous millet and other crops.

To study the effects of French trade policy on the Senegalese industries of groundnuts and millet, I consider several variables concerning economic and trade-oriented aspects of agricultural industries. I hand picked metrics from both the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Bank based on data availability and relevance to my study. While my goal

was to collect hard data from 1930 on, I could only find numbers in my research from 1960-2013. Thus, metrics from 1930-1960 will be presented in a description of trends gathered from historical sources on Senegal. The variables chosen are somewhat subjective, but are also employed in other studies of these industries (see Gray 2002, Akobundu 1998). The same indicators are used both for groundnuts and millet, so that we can authentically juxtapose the evolution of the two industries. The first set of indicators I chose is country-based and concerns level of production of each crop. These metrics are: tons produced, area harvested, yield (hectogram/hectare), and domestic supply. I chose the metric of area harvested as it will show trends of how much area is dedicated to each crop's production. I chose yield to determine the use of agricultural technologies and investment into each industry as one would expect yield to rise over time as new methods/technologies are used. Finally, I chose domestic supply to determine how much of each crop stays within the country to see whether there any shifts within the export/domestic crop labels I put in place on groundnuts and millet.

The second set of metrics I chose concern the trade and international aspects of my study. It consists of: tons exported, gross production value, world price, and Federal Direct Investment (FDI) in Senegal. I chose tons exported to track levels of trade and reliance on the crop as an international industry. I chose world price and production value as these metrics should track incentives and terms of trade between exporter and importer countries. The indicator FDI in Senegal does not relate directly to the two crops I am studying, but will help show the reliance between Senegal and core (imperial) countries through dependence on monetary investment.

I also tracked the top importer of groundnuts from Senegal from 1962-2014 and the top source of groundnuts that France imported from during the same time period to follow how strongly Senegal relies on France for trade and to track the extent to which France maintains a trade relationship in raw goods with Senegal. France and Senegal exchange other goods as well, but since my study concerns groundnuts, I am only following this specific industry. I gathered this data from the Observatory of Economic Complexity which tracks world imports and exports over time.

When I made graphical representations of these metrics I laid them over a general timeline of eras I previously laid out in International Political Economy. The colors chosen to represent these eras correspond to the prominent trade ideology during each era. The Bretton Woods Era and the Third Wave of Globalization are both colored red because both eras promoted open trade and globalization. The Post-Bretton Woods Era is colored yellow to represent its mercantilist and protectionist qualities, a break between the globalist eras. Finally, the post-2008/ Modern Era is colored blue because it is not yet characterized within globalization or protectionism. The same color of the Bretton Woods Era and the Third Wave of Globalization should help direct us to any shared trends and help assess if globalist policies either promote or hinder groundnut and millet production/exports.

### 2.3.2. Justification for chosen policy

The second part of my data collection concerns France's and the EU's international trade policies. I chose which policies to include based on policies highly cited in the study of international political economy within those policies, ones that specifically concern commodity trade and former colonies. Within this set of policies, I chose between five and ten policies per

economic era (mercantilist, liberalism, neoliberalism, etc.) from 1930 to today. From 1930-1944, the policies chosen concerned only France with regard to its colonies. After 1944, I incorporate trade policy designed by Europe and other international bodies in which France takes part in because with the formation of Bretton Woods institutions the world became much more intertwined. Considering my methods of collection, the policies I have chosen should be taken with a grain of salt as they are based on my own previous studies and research. The policies chosen can be found in the references of the essay (see Bibliography).

## **2.4. Results**

### **2.4.1. Description of trends from 1930-1960**

To gather some understanding of the industries of groundnuts and millet during the pre-independence period of 1930-1960 in Senegal, I turned towards historical books and surveys of Senegal, written mainly by French administrators. The data I found for this period only encompasses groundnuts and not millet (Vanhaeverbeke 1970). The records the administrators kept were for the French government and French business people who were concerned with the commodity industry of groundnuts. Because there was no financial interest in millet, there is no data that I could find on its production before 1960. This being said, the data that I found from Vanhaeverbeke describes a dip in production levels of groundnuts to 190,000 tons during the first half of the 1930s (in line with the global depression) and a steady increase in production to 542,000 tons in 1940 until the middle of World War II when production dipped again to 108,000 tons produced in 1943 (Vanhaeverbeke 1970). After this point, groundnut production levels trended upwards, reaching 662,000 tons in 1959. The production levels are in line with global events and resources available, as one would expect

production levels would dip with demand shocks such as depression or when losing a war.

Nonetheless, groundnut production levels increased by three times over the period of 1930-1960, as a strong trade network existed between France and Senegal.

#### 2.4.2. Figures of Variables and Description of Observations

As I describe trends in data, I will only be addressing the numbers I have from 1961-onward as the description of trends from 1930-1960 is more for contextualization in colonial agriculture than the evolution of the industry after independence. The data I collected shows (Figures 2 and 3) that production of groundnuts in Senegal have been relatively stable since 1961 with 829,000 to 677,456 tons of groundnuts produced in 1961 and 2013. Production levels of millet have slightly increased from 1961 to 2013 with 334,300 to 515,365 tons of millet produced, respectively.

Year	Tons Produced	Exports (tons-shelled)	Exports (tons--groundnut oil)	Area Harvested (ha)	Yield (hectogram /hectare)	Gross Production Value (2004-2006 1000int \$!)	Domestic Supply (tons)
1961	829000	125779	125779	967,000	9,961	461068.146	600013
1965	1121000	868000	142544	1,114,000	10,063	505731.303	698585
1970	589950	75711	146065	989,918	5,960	266151.8129	859691
1975	1444093	13378	196653	1,302,300	11,089	651492.4483	966827
1980	523003	3844	73794	1,074,742	4,866	235949.1424	629518
1985	601246	618	50237	604,573	9,945	271247.9242	381050
1990	702584	27265	130697	913,948	7,687	316965.8535	675319
1995	790617	9320	54518	790617	9320	54518	688551
2000	1061540	6017	100536	1061540	6017	100536	780534
2005	703373	731	23673	703373	731	23673	612650
2010	1286856	6243	50033	1286856	6243	50033	830643
2013	677456	39305	16418	677456	39305	16418	863157

**Figure 2. Groundnut Data, 1961-2013**

Year	Tons Produced	Exports (tons)	Area Harvested (ha)	Yield (hectogram/hectare)	Gross Production Value (2004-2006 1000int \$!)	Domestic Supply (tons)	FDI Investment (2016 USD)
1961	334300	0	738,100	4,529	60658.0664	334300	n/a
1965	454000	0	950,000	4,779	82377.392	406000	n/a
1970	326700	0	856,400	3,815	59279.0616	396700	5000000
1975	506100	176	845,700	5,984	91830.8328	577924	22537140.75
1980	451000	1983	951,400	4,740	81833.048	479017	14483180.8
1985	768000	0	1,146,000	6,702	139352.064	583000	-15803661.97
1990	504801	1	864,842	5,837	91595.13185	589714	56893144.78
1995	666805	0	890,880	7,485	120990.4336	586805	31673945.42
2000	600221	1	842,124	7,127	108908.9	600220	81440916.06
2005	608551	6	800,763	7,600	110420.3618	378545	167877437.2
2010	813295	4	1,033,157	7,872	147570.7477	713291	266107641.3
2013	515365	285	754,274	6,833	103816.3804	650080	311278297.3

Figure 3. Millet Data, 1961-2013





Figure 4.





**Figure 5.**

Yields of both crops followed the same trend with a slight rise in yield of millet

(4,529-6,833hg/ha) and a slight decrease in yields of groundnuts (9,961-7,390hg/ha) (Figure 5).

Exports of groundnuts has drastically decreased from a total of 505,266 tons exported in 1961 to 55,723 exported in 2013 (Figure 6). The dropoff of exports occurs towards the tail end of the Bretton Woods Era, a year or two before countries started turning inwards. Exports increased again for a short period in the 1970s, dropping off again in the mid 1980s. Exports of millet stayed for the most part nonexistent or very low during the period as expected since it is a domestically consumed crop (Figure 3). Gross Production Value of groundnuts decreased by almost 450,000 International Dollars over the period of study while the GPV of millet rose about 40,000 International Dollars over the 52 year period (Figure 7). This is a dramatic decrease for groundnuts and seems to start between 1990 and 1995 (Figure 2).




Figure 6.




Figure 7.

As a whole amongst metrics, millet has either remained stable or slightly risen, while groundnuts have decreased dramatically or remained relatively stable. One metric that has risen dramatically is Foreign Direct Investment from 5,000,000 USD in 1970 to 311,278,297.3 in 2013 which indicates major international interests in Senegal. This rise seems to really take hold in the 1990s, right around the time of the Washington Consensus.

Concerning policies, the trends seemed to follow the eras set out in the study of IPE (Figure 8). France traded heavily with its colonial regions, forming a colonial trade block during the interwar period and slowly liberalized/opened trade after World War II and the advent of Bretton Woods institutions. The timeline of policies show that there is a general trend towards incentivizing export-crops from developing countries by keeping duties and tariffs low in imports to the European Union after World War II until the 1990s (Figure 6). Examples of these policies include the Yaounde Convention and the Lomé Convention which both gave preferential trade status to former colonies, especially concerning agricultural products. This changed when the WTO established clear trade rules in 1995 during the Third Wave of Globalization which required that countries treat every other nation with “most favored nation status” (Stiglitz 2002). This means that no state can give another state a trade deal that is better or worse than it is offering to another country (thereby eliminating the preference given to former colonies).

# ERAS IN TRADE POLICY

French/EU Trade Policy in IPE Eras from 1930-2017

.....

## INTERWAR INSTABILITY (1930-1944)

1930

1939- World War II begins

1930- France maintains Gold Standard during the Great Depression.

1940

1930s-1940s- France trades heavily with its colonies, imports raw materials and exports manufactured goods to colonies

1936- France abandons Gold Standard to lessen the effects of depreciation

1930s- France enacts massive import quotas to cut down on trade deficit

## BRETTON WOODS INSTITUTIONS (1944-1974)

1945

1960

1960- Senegal wins independence from France  
1963- Yaoundé Convention gives trade preference to 18 former colonies, including Senegal  
1974- Bretton Woods' institutions fail to function after U.S. goes off Gold Standard

1945- Bretton Woods Institutions created: IMF, World Bank, ITO

1948- General Treaty on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) removes subsidies and trade restrictions (excluding agriculture)

1957- France joins the European Economic Community (EEC)

## POST-BRETTON WOODS IDEAS (1975-1994)

1975


1985

1983-1992- France reduces imports to restore trade balance  
1993- European Union forms

1973-1979- GATT trade round in Tokyo works to reduce tariffs globally

1975- Lomé Convention tries to integrate LDCs into world economy through preferential trade

1984- Senegal receives its first Structural Adjustment Program through the IMF with conditions to liberalize economy



**Figure 8. Timeline of Policies and Events**

Thus, even though least developed countries (LDCs) are not subject to any duties, they are also not allowed to be a part of any preferential trade deals because that is “unfair” in the rules of the WTO (Brenton 2005). After these rules were enacted most aid to former colonies seems to come through international institutions such as the IMF and from foreign investment by private businesses rather than from the European Union through heavy importation of goods.

The final component of my study, the relationship between France and Senegal concerning groundnut exports/imports, yielded some interesting results. For both countries they were each other’s main exporter/importer of groundnut oil until 2000 (Figure 9). After

2000, Senegal exported the greatest percentage of groundnuts to France in only three years, 2004, 2005 and 2012. China seems to be the major recent importer of Senegal with the greatest percentage of groundnut oil imported in 2009, 2010 and 2013 (see Appendix). This seems to coincide with the removal of preferential trade agreements in the European Union. France still imports a significant percentage of groundnuts from Senegal, but is beginning to import more from Latin American countries. Groundnut trade between Senegal and France peaked between 1984 to about 2000 with a majority of imports and exports between both.

Year	Percent Exported to France	Top Importer	Percent Imported from Senegal	Top Source Country
1962	46	France	48	Senegal
1965	45	France	47	Senegal
1970	43	France	43	Senegal
1975	42	France	41	Senegal
1980	43	France	14	Senegal
1985	68	France	28	Senegal
1990	65	France	28	Senegal
1995	52	France	47	Senegal
2000	45	France	41	Senegal
2005	59	France	35	Senegal
2010	16	China	35	Senegal
2014	27	China	41	Senegal

**Figure 9. French and Senegalese Trade Relationship in Groundnuts**

### 3. Discussion:

#### **3.1. Important Trends Explained**

Now that we have delved into the process and results of my research, I want to bring us back to the central questions of my study; how have French influence and policies since the colonial period affected the industries of groundnuts and millet in Senegal? And, are export-based agricultural industries or domestic ones promoted in a post-colonial trade arena? After conducting my research I maintain that France has, up until recently, maintained a central trade relationship with Senegal, at least with groundnuts, which has possibly influenced Senegalese agriculture. However, as this relationship was maintained through trade and not structural investment, yields seem to have stabilized/decreased slightly over time in groundnuts. This is partly due to climate change factors such as increased frequency of drought in Senegal and soil degradation from 150 years of peanut monoculture (Sonneveld et al 2016). It is also influenced by lack of investment/aid in agricultural technologies and education that ended with Senegal's independence. This is because as the world turned towards liberalization of trade and supply-side economics, the state of Senegal cannot subsidize agricultural production, minimizing the profits of farmers to reinvest in their business and grow domestically consumed food such as millet.

It may be difficult to visualize how open and free trade yields stagnation in agriculture and a state's economy so I will break it down here. As we saw in the results of my study, the EU used to give preferential treatment in agricultural products to former colonies such as Senegal and that these agreements were eroded after the establishment of trade rules in the World Trade Organization (Figure 6). This removal of preferential treatment in conjunction with

Structural Adjustment Programs provided by the IMF, such as the one Senegal received in 1984. This program is a package of conditions based on the Washington Consensus ideology and required Senegal to remove most protections and regulations on their industries, including agriculture, to make their market favorable to foreign investment (Lall 1995). This is in line with the expansion of foreign direct investment in Senegal in the 1990s that I noticed when collecting my data (Figure 3). Such heavy foreign investment puts Senegal at the mercy of investors who can pull out of their economy at any time (Stiglitz 2002). In addition, the IMF program specifies that governments are not allowed to run deficits, thus limiting government investment in industries such as agricultural technology or education (Lall 1995). Deficit reduction limits government investment in these areas because it does not allow for spending in unprofitable institutions that will increase the government's budget. This is why I claim that pressure to liberalize from international institutions dominated by the Global North (of which France in the EU is a major player) have stagnated/deteriorated the export industry of groundnuts and left out millet as a major crop in Senegal because they require Senegal to open up fully to a volatile world market without investment in the industry itself. This and a continued reliance on income from agricultural exports such as groundnuts exported to the Global North keeps farmers within the global system because there is already an infrastructural system in place that favors groundnuts.

My findings do support the foundational ideas of World Systems Analysis as it relies on an exploitative relationship between core and periphery countries. The biggest indicator of exploitation is that the Gross Production Value of groundnuts has decreased dramatically even though production has decreased only slightly. At the same time, GPV has risen for millet, but



production has not increased by any major standing. This finding demonstrates a reliance on groundnuts and an existing export-oriented infrastructure that is hard to break out of even though profits and export levels are decreasing. This infrastructure and history make it more difficult to move towards domestic production or even a diversification of agricultural products because it requires changing a now cultural and economic norm.

There are some limitations to what I can conclude in my study. Unfortunately as I was not able to obtain numerical data for the time period of 1930-1960 I can only generalize trends during that time period. It is also impossible to say that liberalization and structural adjustment programs directly cause the stagnation in agricultural production of groundnuts and millet in Senegal. There are so many factors that go into an agricultural industry that it would be ignorant to conclude that these trends in policy are the deciding factor. However, I argue that they are influential in these industries as they establish relationships between trading countries and dictate what a government can and cannot spend money on because they must balance their budget (Stiglitz 2002). The other limitation of my study is that it incorporates other countries besides France and the EU in the trade policy timeline, but it is also hard to separate France from global political policies as it has a significant influence in making this policy. Therefore, while I admit that my methods of research are not perfect, I do believe that they illuminate a part of colonial legacies that is important to talk about; how imperial power is institutionalized and how it exploits and suppresses post-colonial state autonomy.

### 3.2. What about millet?



**Figure 10. Concept Map of Actors and Processes**

It may seem as if I have neglected millet throughout the course of this study. This is somewhat intentional as I want to argue that export commodities do have all the power in the global trade arena, i.e. groundnuts have the power in this study (Figure 8). Because millet is mainly consumed within Senegal and its surrounding countries it is not of much interest to the Global North. However, millet is a staple grain in Senegal, whose third and fifth largest imports are now rice and wheat, also staple grains (OEC 2014). The ability of a country to produce its own food is often a sign of stability because it can provide for itself in times of world crisis when trade/income from trade may not be so readily available (Tscharrntke et al 2012). Agricultural commodities undermine this aspect of food security because they require large amounts of land that are dedicated to producing products that will not be eaten by citizens.

As of 2014 Senegal has a cereal dependency ratio of 46 percent (FAO STAT 2014). Cereal dependency ratio tells us how much of a country’s cereal (i.e. wheat, millet, rice) is imported and how much comes from domestic production. It is calculated by (cereal imports -

cereal exports)/(cereal production + cereal imports - cereal exports) \* 100. Negative values mean that a country is a net exporter of cereal such as France whose value is -9 percent (FAO STAT 2014). This ratio tells us that Senegal is by far a net importer of cereals, therefore it relies on outside sources for much of their foodstuffs. Furthering this point, Senegal spends 58 percent over total values of exports on food imports while France spends only seven percent (FAO STAT 2014). This means that Senegal is spending more than half of its income from exports on food alone. Thus, not only is Senegalese agriculture vulnerable because it relies on the volatile international market for groundnuts, it also relies on market prices for its own food. If a large agricultural industry such as the groundnut were to fail because of bad weather or soil depletion, it would severely cut into funds that are used to import food. As an import-reliant country, Senegal is put in a passive position and less able to bargain on its own terms in the international trade arena because it relies so heavily on trade with other countries.

### **3.3. Reflection on Postcolonial Relationships**

The importance of studying relationships between imperialists and former colonies lies in state autonomy, accountability and contextualization. Even though I studied a very specific industry in a specific state, there are patterns that resonate out to a broader set of postcolonial relationships. As we saw in my timeline of policy, in today's global trade arena imperial relationships play out through trade agreements and norms that favor the Global North such as the free trade rules of the WTO and the advent of the U.S.-formulated Washington Consensus (Figure 8). Helleiner, a political economist notes in his book on the origins of Bretton Woods that postcolonial states were very much a part of the initial negotiations in developing the IMF and World Bank (Helleiner 2014). Despite this initial inclusion, it is evident that their influence

eroded since its conception as IMF development packages began to include more and more conditions on how a country can use their funds through structural adjustment programs such as the three that Senegal has received (Stiglitz 2002). Instead of imperialization through force, the Global North continues to suppress the autonomy of former colonial states through the imperialization of ideas.

This is where we can start to discuss the difference between individual or direct imperialism versus institutionalized imperialism. While European and developed nations are not directly colonizing countries anymore, they have built institutions and norms that allow them to carry on the “burden of modernization” through conditions attached to money and norms of development (Stiglitz 2002). These institutions often ignore the context of a developing nation’s history and the history of its path towards development as well. Modern discourse assumes one path towards development, through a specific set of economic policies, through one ideology of neoliberalism (Lall 1995). By normalizing this specific ideology, the imperial nations once again try to impose their ideals onto countries and cultures where they may not fit or work for their specific circumstance. Thus, postcolonial relationships are carried out more subtly today than the direct methods of colonization, but they are still very much present as discussed in my study.

#### **3.4. Possible ways forward/ Signs of resistance**

Now that I have painted a rather bleak picture of postcolonial relationships and how they play out in the international trade arena, I want to discuss several ways that postcolonial states are fighting back against imperial influence and Global-North domination of international policy. One path of resistance that I find relevant to the case of Senegalese agriculture is the

Vía Campesina movement in Central America. Many nations in Central America share a history of colonization that is similar to West African countries and have experienced struggles with Structural Adjustment Programs and international trade policy regulations on subsidies. La Vía Campesina is the organization that started the Food Sovereignty movement which concerns the right to continue being producers, having access to culturally appropriate food and the right to define one's agricultural and food systems (Vía Campesina 2011). This movement is a push-back against globalization norms, with a focus on the "peasant" farmer (a small-scale farmer) rather than on huge agricultural business rights. It is also a movement of resistance against developed countries' agricultural subsidies that set food prices lower than farmers in the Global South can afford to produce. Food sovereignty moves a step past the idea of food security in that it views itself as an ongoing process and something that can not be stated as being met in one place or time (Wald 2015). The movement also stresses process over outcome and values how food needs are being met rather than that they are just being met. This aspect helps address the problematic globalist-corporate tendencies inherent to food security (Wald 2015). So while food security is an important factor in assessing if bodily needs are met through concrete measurements, food sovereignty moves a step further in addressing cultural and socioeconomic issues of food consumption and production.

In Senegal, there is already some action towards this direction in agriculture with a push towards consuming Senegalese-grown food in and around Dakar (Adigbli 2012). Some benefits of the Food Sovereignty movement are that it puts a focus on people who are most vulnerable and that it encourages food self-sufficiency of a country which can help to break countries out of unequal power relationships, like those between imperial and postcolonial states. However,

it does requires initial investment and policy to bolster the position of small farmers and acceptance on the part of the consumers to pay more for food, which is not easy and requires resources that not every country has. If international funds could be put towards local initiatives like Food Sovereignty, that might be one path towards breaking the unequal power relationship between France and Senegal or other postcolonial relationships.

One other trend that I did not discuss much is the emergence of China as the new largest importer of Senegalese groundnuts. According to the data I gathered, in the six most recent years of study China has been the top importer of Senegalese groundnuts for three of those years. Trade with China thus exceeds trade with France which was the top importer for only one of those years (see Appendix). This trend will likely lessen European influence on the groundnut industry, at least through reliance on its business for income (Cissé 2014). While China's role may put Senegal in a different unequal power relationship, it would not be as tied as it is to France in the groundnut industry. As new trading partners like China emerge, Senegal may be in a better position to demand more from its trading partners as it would no longer rely on one source to purchase groundnuts. As Senegalese agriculture continues to scale out from the era of French colonialism, I would like to see how its trade relationships with other countries develop as an avenue of future research.

### **3.5. Back to the bigger picture**

As stated at the very beginning of this paper, global power is dynamic and elusive to many. There is reason to think that imperial influence will not last forever in postcolonial countries even though it still resonates in their political, cultural, and even agricultural institutions. By developing ways to track these relationships through international policy and

other institutions we can track and learn more about how and why global power shifts occur. It is important that we understand how unequal power relationships last long after they are established, that they may be more hidden or normalized than they were previously, but still exist.

We can see this power dynamic play out between postcolonial states and imperialist countries, as well between other aspects of the human experience. We can understand global power as not only situated within states but within race, gender and money (Chowdhry 2003). Through studying intersectionalities between these aspects of power we can pick out the types of circumstances in which they form. When we form these connections, it helps us to consider how to start a discourse in global inequality through methods other than development and poverty. Development terms are often essentialist in assuming that all countries are heading towards a similar path and in that development alleviation and poverty alleviation are intertwined (Burney 2012). Intersectionality is a more inclusive and contextual way of discussing global power and inequality because it takes inequality out of the state and into people and their histories (Chowdhry 2003). Essentializing global inequalities in development rhetoric ignores their origins and I hope that conducting this study helps to contextualize one such inequality.

### **3.6. Suggestion for further research**

Before we conclude, I would like to highlight some topics that I did not bring up in my study, but that would be interesting to follow up on considering what I have learned. The first which I mentioned briefly, is that of the relationship between China and Senegalese groundnuts. I think it would be interesting to see what type of trade relationship this develops into namely; will

Chinese interest give the groundnut industry the boost to expand and develop further? Or will it become another exploitative relationship between a global power and a state trying to find its place in the arena? Another aspect that I could not dive into in this paper is the role of Senegal in international trade policy negotiations. I think it would be interesting to see how much of a role Senegal/West Africa had in formulating policy, their reactions to the finalized policy, and what aspects that they wanted in policy that were ignored. I feel that a comprehensive study of the role of West Africa in international policy formulation in institutions such as the United Nations and the WTO would be helpful in understanding how West Africa wants to move forward. This study would also be helpful in assessing how international institutions can take West African considerations into making policy.

### **3.7. Conclusions**

In this study I found that global power is dynamic and can be situated in economic policy and in postcolonial institutions such as commodity-oriented agriculture. Postcolonial relationships are unique institutions of global power in that there is an established unequal relationship between the colonizer and colonized. One way to examine the evolution of these relationships is through looking at trends in trade policy and how they can influence industries such as agriculture in postcolonial countries. I found that a normalization of neoliberal ideology and supply-side economics may play a part in the lack of diversification and growth in the agricultural industries of groundnuts and millet in Senegal. Through contextualising this modern development issue, we can track how it formed and what forces allow it to persist today. Following a relationship between postcolonial agriculture and international trade policy is only



one method of contextualization, but an important one in telling stories of colonial legacies and global inequality.

## Appendix

### Data: French and Senegalese Trade Relationship in Groundnuts

Year	Percent Exported to France	Top Importer	Percent Imported from Senegal	Top Source Country
1962	46	France	48	Senegal
1963	44	France	48	Senegal
1964	42	France	47	Senegal
1965	45	France	47	Senegal
1966	49	France	46	Senegal
1967	48	France	46	Senegal
1968	44	France	43	Senegal
1969	44	France	39	Senegal
1970	43	France	43	Senegal
1971	47	France	30	Senegal
1972	42	France	40	Senegal
1973	42	France	21	Senegal
1974	49	France	35	Senegal
1975	42	France	41	Senegal
1976	36	France	40	Senegal
1977	40	France	37	Senegal
1978	47	France	19	Senegal
1979	44	France	25	Senegal
1980	43	France	14	Senegal
1981	34	France	4.3	Brazil
1982	40	France	28	Senegal
1983	40	France	30	Senegal
1984	77	France	64	Senegal
1985	68	France	28	Senegal
1986	84	France	45	Senegal
1987	79	France	55	Senegal
1988	74	France	66	Senegal
1989	69	France	75	Senegal
1990	65	France	61	Senegal
1991	57	France	54	Senegal
1992	66	France	44	Senegal
1993	58	France	38	Senegal
1994	60	France	49	Senegal

1995	52	France	47	Senegal
1996	60	France	55	Senegal
1997	63	France	41	Senegal
1998	63	France	41	Senegal
1999	51	France	41	Senegal
2000	45	France	59	Senegal
2001	30	Italy	59	Senegal
2002	37	Italy	48	Senegal
2003	39	Italy	26	Argentina
2004	49	France	22	India
2005	59	France	35	Senegal
2006	17	Italy	20	Argentina
2007	22	Italy	31	Belgium
2008	34	Italy	14	Argentina
2009	13	China	12	Argentina
2010	16	China	30	Senegal
2011	14	Lebanon	37	Senegal
2012	65	France	10	Argentina
2013	39	Netherlands	22	Nicaragua
2014	27	China	41	Senegal

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