The relationship between China and Tibet has been strained and often violent for centuries. Their history instilled inequalities within the region that have had lasting and ever developing impacts. As China continues to grow as a world power, ethnic biases between Han Chinese and Tibetans become increasingly apparent. Due to China’s large influence today, and the attention that such power brings, global perspectives on issues regarding Tibet vary. One of the major factors raising controversy is the vast amount of water running from the Tibetan Plateau. The majority of China’s major rivers, such as the Yangtze, begin on the Plateau. Furthermore, because Tibet holds 81% of the county’s water, problems arise partly because the majority of China’s population and arable land is in the North (Varis, 2001). Despite the vast amounts of water, tensions are rising due to the dilemma of distributing fairly to a population that currently exceeds its resource. The transfer of water from Southern to Northern China requires a rapid increase of modernization within the Tibetan region. This influx of new technologies and capital has dramatically changed Tibetan culture, in combination with other influences. Specifically, the need for hydropower and the infrastructure that comes with it has altered Tibetan natural and social landscapes. While it is the responsibility of a country to administer their resources appropriately, conflict appears when considering the dynamics of local authority versus national priority. In the case of Tibet, the power of local authority over their greatest resource, water, is often put into question due to the historical ethnic biases between Tibetans and Han Chinese. China’s need for massive amounts of water to sustain its population, and the policies that have been implemented to support this dynamic, emphasize a lack of local Tibetan influence in comparison to China’s overarching power. This paper will first discuss the various complexities regarding the historical degradation of Tibet’s cultural identity through China’s overwhelming economic and political power. It will continue on to present ideas surrounding the developing issues regarding China’s increasing need for water, and the complicated dynamics of Tibet’s current social state and ethnic biases.
Contrasting the religious backgrounds of the two nations illuminates differences that contributed to violence and destruction within the Tibetan region. One of the most defining aspects of Tibetan culture is the common practice of Buddhism. This religion has been ingrained within their culture since the seventh century. In large, Tibet became a peaceful nation when their strong relationship with Buddhism was formed. “Becoming a Buddhist, at a certain moment in history, meant graduating from primitive uncouthness to a superior stage in civilization” (Ngapo, 1981, p. 160). China also has a background in Buddhism. The religion came to China from India in the first century AD, even before it spread to Tibet. However, it did not have as strong or as permanent of an influence. In 1949 when the Communists rose to power in China, religious activity was discouraged and strictly controlled because it was believed to be anti socialist (Ngapo, 1981). Historical conflicts between Tibet and China are rooted in much more than their religious differences. However, Tibet’s strong connection to the practice of Buddhism and Communist China’s lack of strong religious ties contributed greatly to the conflicting dynamics of a peaceful nation and a heavily militarized one.
By further examining the history between China and Tibet, the context for remaining inequalities between the two peoples today becomes clear. Simon Normanton (1989) explains that conflicts between the two regions stretch back as early as 821 AD. Tibet and China eventually signed a peace treaty that extinguished discord for a time. This treaty was 1000 years old when China disregarded the agreement and invaded Tibet in 1910 (Normanton, 1989). Sperling’s (2004) research indicates that after the Chinese Manchu Empire was overthrown in 1911, Tibet declared their independence in 1912. Tibet ruled as an independent country for nearly forty years. When the Chinese Communist Party came into power in 1949, drastic changes began to unfold in China. This same year, without any provocation, China invaded Tibet once again. Tibet had to quickly reorganize militarily in order to attempt to resist the Chinese forces. On October 7th, 1950, the powerful Chinese army attacked the Tibetan people (Normanton, 1989). The United Nations indicated that they wished Tibet and China would come to a peaceful agreement, ultimately indicating that no aid would be provided for Tibet.
By the beginning of 1951 the Chinese had established themselves in Tibet and destroyed the insignificant Tibetan army, solidifying their hold over the nation (Sperling, 2004). At this time, captive Tibetan soldiers were released and monasteries were respected, allowing China to settle into their control without revolt (Normanton, 1989). Sangmun (2009) explains that during 1951 the young ruler of Tibet, the 15-year-old Dalai Lama, was unsuccessfully attempting to negotiate the Seventeen Point Agreement. This agreement, written by the Chinese government, only ended in providing China with further grounds to control Tibet. The Dalai Lama’s hope was to obtain a relaxation of China’s growing power, but in actuality the agreement made it impossible for Tibet to exist as an independent country (Sangmun, 2009).
As Chinese Chairman Mao Zedong’s power grew, it became apparent that Tibet would be just as impacted by the changes Mao was attempting to instill in China. The “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution” was initiated in 1966 by the Chinese Communist Party and lasted until 1976. Joseph (2001) argues that Mao’s main objective was to restore the strength of socialism, and prevent the growth of capitalism. Fighting broke out in Eastern Tibet under the new regime. Chinese methods had changed due to Mao’s severe influence: monasteries were destroyed, the people were brutally treated, and children were taken to be “re-educated” in China. The leaders of Tibet were tried, denounced, and often tortured or killed. In 1960, four thousand monks were evacuated from the Puncheon Lama’s monastery, Tashilhunpo, by the Chinese army; many committed suicide (Normanton, 1989). “The people believed with rocklike faith that the power of religion would suffice to protect their independence” (Normanton, 1989, p. 164). Consequently, this strong connection to Buddhism made Tibet, in combination with its small military force and other factors, an easy country to gain political, economic, and cultural control over. “The complete disruption of the country’s political organization, religious institutions and all normal life was now to be accompanied by a social revolution. The re-education of Tibet began.” (Normanton, 1989, p. 181).
As violence continued in Tibet through the 1960’s, refugees fled the region. Thousands went to Nepal but the majority fled to India. In 1967, the Red Guards entered Lhasa, the capitol of Tibet. The cathedral was ransacked, scriptures were burned and artifacts smashed. Libraries, shrines, prayer flags, Tibetan clothing, and decorations were destroyed. Women were raped, nomads abused, and famine spread throughout the country (Normanton, 1989). The Chinese cultural suppression in Tibet escalated to a new level. The death toll from this time is officially not documented due to restriction of information. However, according to Rowell (1990), by 1972 approximately 34 million people had been killed under Mao’s regime in both the Tibetan region and the rest of China.
Due to China’s global power, their invasion of Tibet went unopposed. China’s large influence during the Cold War, in addition to their expanding trade with other powerful nations, emphasized how commanding China had become. China’s overwhelmingly large population, powerful economy, and political influence further secures its role as a global power today. Additionally, because it solidified control over Tibet, China maintains access to Nepal, India, Burma, and Bhutan. Through the destruction that occurred in the process of annexing Tibet, deep ethnic inequalities between the Tibetans and Han Chinese were created.
Regional inequality was low in the first years of communist rule…but rose precipitously during the Great Leap Forward. It then fell back, until the effects of the Cultural Revolution started an increase in inequality that peaked in 1976. Following this, the transition from the Cultural Revolution to the period of rural reform saw a decline in inequality through until the mid-1980s. Since then decentralization and opening the economy to trade and investment has brought a steady increase in inequality between regions. (Kanbur & Venables, 2007, p. 207)
This analysis emphasizes a correlation between fluctuating levels of inequality within China and growing cultural destruction within Tibet. Ultimately, this interpretation indicates that inequality levels are currently rising partially due to China’s development into a highly industrialized and economically dominant country.
China’s growing demand for water from the Tibetan region is an increasingly important dynamic. Water may soon be considered more valuable than oil in that the “rapid population growth and the strive for economic development has severely stressed natural renewable resources, so much so that fresh water is beginning to have a scarcity value and emotional intensity that exist for fossil fuel” (Swain, 2013, p. 179). As the world population rises, the global run-off per capita has diminished from 40,000 m3 per person in 1800 to 6,840 m3 in 1995, and is estimated to fall further to 4,692 m3 by 2025 (Toset, 2000). In combination with its value, the growing need for this limited resource creates conflict. It is estimated that in the mid 1980’s “there were at least ten places in the world where war could break out over dwindling shared water” (Toset, 2000, p. 17). Over twenty years later the earth’s population has grown immensely and the availability of water is becoming a main concern for many regions of the world.
These concerns are especially prominent in China, which is considered a Newly Industrialized Country. These countries are defined as: “countries which have made profound structural changes in their economies under conditions of a fast growth rate” (Bozyk, 2006, p. 164). China is “now the world’s biggest consumer of grain, meat, coal, and steel, and the biggest market for-and marker of-automobiles. It’s also the world’s biggest emitter of carbon…There are now at least a hundred fifty Chinese cities with more than a million people; by 2025, there will be two hundred twenty… the construction will only increase…In 2012, China was adding another million people about every seven weeks” (Weisman, 2013, p. 167). China’s extensive growth has generated environmental repercussions that are now “exacting [their] own toll on the Chinese people, impinging on continued economic development, forcing large-scale migration, and inflicting significant harm on the public’s health” (Economy, 2010, para. 1). China’s population is exponentially increasing the need for industrial agriculture and large quantities of power. “[China’s] rapid urbanization, industrialization, growing agricultural demand, environmental degradation, and potential climate-related threats will be the major driving forces that challenge the management and utilization of China’s water resources over the decades to come. China’s environmental pressures already exceed the carrying capacity of this densely populated land” (Varis, 2001, para. 1). The vast majority of China’s water flows in Tibet. Because most of the population lives in the North of China, this unique dynamic creates many environmental and social issues.
China’s use of the Tibetan Plateau’s water is increasing partially due to the effects of climate change. The Plateau holds 100,000 sq. kilometers of glaciers, which provide water to around 1.4 billion people, according to Qui (2012). Because the Tibetan Plateau and the glaciers that reside on it are at such a high elevation, they are retreating, or melting, faster than any other due to climate change, thus pouring more water down the mountains. This creates the prospect of mass amounts of hydropower. Wirsing (2012) explains that China is now the world’s largest energy consumer, and also the leader in hydroelectricity capacity, reaching 213,000MW in 2010. China has already built half of the world’s forty-five thousand biggest dams (Wirsing, 2012, para. 3). Despite their use of hydropower, China’s energy consumption has been three times less efficient than the world’s average (Haertling, 2007). “China’s enormous and ever increasing population, along with the accompanying difficulties of effectively managing resource use and consumption, makes the continued deterioration of China’s environment one of the biggest problems the world faces today” (Haertling, 2007, para. 2).
The Lhaza River basin, with an annual average flow of 11 cubic kilometers, has enormous hydropower capacity potential but less than one percent has been exploited (Gustafsson, 1993). The country’s plans are only to expand on this energy, “[meaning] that China aims to have 430,000 MW of hydropower capacity hardly a decade hence, the equivalent of one new Three Gorges Dam each year over the current decade” (Wirsing, 2012, para. 3). The immense impacts of these projects is emphasized in Weisman’s book Countdown (2013):
The Three Gorges Dam on the Yangtze, which displaced 1.3 million people, is the biggest, costliest construction in human history. It will soon be surpassed by the even costlier South-North Water Transfer Project, which will take a half-century to complete and will channel the equivalent of another Yellow River twelve hundred kilometers north from the Yangtze Delta to thirsty regions around Beijing. (Weisman, 2013, p. 167 – 168).
These massive increases in hydroelectric dams have huge environmental consequences and created political tensions. In addition to this, the displacement of nomadic and rural Tibetans begins to display remaining ethic biases, especially impacting rural populations. Even despite potential environmental and social issues, China will continue to develop hydropower project largely because their economic strength and military power allow them to.
The situation of the Brahmaputra, one of the major rivers descending from the Plateau, emphasizes the conflicts arising due varying benefits and China’s national priority regarding this resource. The Brahmaputra flows through China, India, and Bangladesh, which subsequently are the world’s first, second, and seventh most highly populated countries (Wirsing, 2012). These three countries have extreme problems with water scarcity, and thus rely on Tibet’s water. Furthermore, energy is required to support such a large population, thus creating competition between countries for hydroelectric power down the river. What now concerns the benefactors of the Brahmaputra, is China’s plan to create multiple hydropower dam sites in the Tibetan region. The idea is to artificially change the course of the river at the point in the Himalayas where it curves south into Nepal and India, while simultaneously creating energy (Wirsing, 2012). The redirecting of this resource for the benefit of China’s population alone could create conflict between nations, involving Tibet, even though it is the North’s need for water that generates the problem.
Ultimately, China does not have the amount of water required to sustain its people without continuing to expand major environmental and social changes. In combination with other influences, because the Plateau holds the large majority of China’s water, there is pressure put on Tibet to modernize. Modernization is specifically increasing within the region due to the capital that is brought in through new technologies and infrastructure. These technologies are used to harness the previously described hydroelectricity potential of Tibetan rivers and lakes. Through this new infrastructure, much of that water and energy is moved to the Northern cities.
For the South-North Water Transfer, which will tunnel under the Yellow River itself, water must be pumped uphill over more than half its distance. That is akin to tilting Asia to make water flow backward, frightening to Shanghai, whose Yangtze Delta water will be siphoned northward. Shanghai has already pumped so much water that it has sunk six feet. The South-North project assumes there will be higher rainfall in upper Yangtze basins as global temperatures rise. But so far, climate change instead has brought droughts so deep that coal barges can’t navigate low river levels, causing power shortages and driving China to the brink of needing to import rice and wheat” (Weisman, 2013, p. 167 – 168)
In combination with extreme environmental degradation, extensive alterations to Tibetan landscapes and infrastructure are accruing because of such high demand for water. These changes can be scrutinized differently depending on how the increasing influence of the Han Chinese is perceived. While Tibetan’s still have access to enough water and electricity, their lack of local authority regarding these relatively new developments is apparent.
The policies that have been implemented by the Chinese government in order to take advantage of such water sources have different political, environmental, and cultural impacts. Although it is true that some Tibetans have obtained higher standards of living because of the massive increase in hydropower, “[t]he Tibetan government-in-exile asserts that construction of hydroelectric dams in Tibet similarly excludes Tibetan from securing jobs. It has also been noted that the electricity generated by the dams goes primarily to benefit Chinese immigrants, while most Tibetans continue to live without electricity” (Haertling, 2007, p. 17). While this may be partially true in some areas, the Tibetan authorities in exile have very different views of current political dynamics in the region compared to those who actually live there. According to Gustafsson (1993), China has created a policy promoting land and water improvement projects in Tibet, including hydroelectric damming, which will prove to diminish rural land area, nomadic culture, and promote total modernization (Gustafsson, 1993). This large-scale modernization is largely welcomed by many urbanized Tibetans, but simultaneously disrupts nomadic ways of life. However, resettlement housing for Tibetans, can be portrayed in a more positive light. Feng Quin is a resettlement village were nearly 30 million displaced Tibetans now live due to the impacts of the South-North Water Transfer Project.
About three hundred households were ensconced in stucco multifamily dwellings just off the new highway. Nobody complained, however, about trading mud huts in the forest for brick dwellings with electricity, TV, and toilets, and getting a subsidy as well. More than two hundred men and women were off working in eastern China factories or construction, earning Y10,000 annually, returning home once a year. Yet many still resisted giving up farming. Most of them, overwhelmingly male and single, now tended mulberry trees for silkworm food. (Weisman, 2013, p. 194).
A certain level of acceptance of modernization is displayed here, while still emphasizing that there are many different perspectives taken by Tibetans. The extensive cultural changes that have occurred cannot be ignored in addition to ethnic biases that remain. While there are overarching benefits of modernization within Tibet for the entire population of China, such as energy and distribution of water, those who receive the benefits without consequences is debatable.
By understanding the historical context in which large-scale cultural destruction occurred in Tibet, its correlation to ethnic biases between the Han Chinese and Tibetan people becomes clear. Although China aims to raise the wealth of Tibet, the policies and programs that are enacted to promote this are not only maintaining biases, but more specifically creating an urban bias. For example, Chinese policies regarding the education of Tibetan Children has been highly inconsistent especially for rural populations. These children may be taught in Tibetan for lower school, and then Chinese for higher education, or vise versa (Haertling, 2007). This inconsistency decreases the likelihood of future success in a more modernized society.
Furthermore, hydroelectric dams displace enormous amounts of rural Tibetans and destroy the land that has been historically lived off of. The development of nomadic resettlement camps within Tibet emphasizes urban-ethnic bias. “Since 2008…[nomads] are no longer allowed to cut timber or graze cattle. Instead, the government sent [them] to learn about ecotourism. They have trained men as guides to explain the scenery and the area’s heritage – Tibetan culture; the Long March of Chairman Mao’s Red Army, which passed through here in 1935 – and to take people to see golden monkeys, deer, and wild oxen” (Weisman, 2013, p. 194). These massive cultural changes promote the influx of Han Chinese influence and completely alter nomadic ways of life. However, this growing influence is not entirely resisted, and is fully accepted by many. “We don’t believe in the Daili Lama. He doesn’t support us; the Chinese government does. We believe in the Communist Party…As an ethnic minority, we Tibetans are allowed to practice Buddhism, and to have three children” (Weisman, 2013, p. 194). From this perspective, it becomes clear that embracing modernization and the national authority of China accepted by some to be the best option. Regardless of these differing opinions, the urban-ethic bias that has developed due to increasing modernization within Tibet is difficult to ignore.
Despite currently developing impacts of modernization within Tibet, both positive and negative, Tibetan Buddhism and its relationship to the environment, emphasizes China’s disregard for local authority. Tibetan’s overwhelmingly popular grounding in Buddhism has historically aided in the preservation of the Plateau’s environment. This region’s type of Buddhism discourages over-consumption and over-exploitation of their natural resources (Haertling, 2007). Furthermore, many lakes and rivers are worshipped in Tibetan Buddhism, emphasizing their deep connection to the natural world and water (Gustafsson, 1993). The current Dalai Lama stated that, “it would be the government of Tibet’s goal to transform Tibet into our planet’s largest natural preserve” (Haertling, 2007, para. 17). This exemplifies the different environmental approaches Tibet has taken in contrast to China’s. Despite the assumed Tibetan reverence for the environment, because there is a lack of local authority in regards to the use of and development of resources, specifically water, China’s national priority has caused massive environmental degradation. In reference to Tibetan environmental health, “[s]imply put, the damage to the Tibetan environment has been allowed to occur because the civil and political rights of the Tibetan people have been systematically repressed since China occupied the territory in 1949” (Haertling, 2007, para. 34). Ultimately, due to the deep ethnic inequalities that have been established between the Tibetan and Chinese people ever since Tibet’s annexation, Tibet’s inability to protect their resources leaves them powerless to defend their culture.
As Milanovic (2007) explains: “If we believe that cultures have some intrinsic value in themselves, then we might feel discomforted by the idea that there are huge differences in income or unbridgeable differences of wealth between nations so that the nations that are in decline might over time disappear…The point is that inequality between countries does not only matter in terms of assessing the efficacy of our current set of development policies, it may also have important social repercussions” (Milanovic, 2007, p. 34-35). These ‘social repercussions’ are relevant for Tibetans in reference to ethic biases. These biases have come to favor urban populations, not only furthering inequalities between Han Chinese and Tibetans, but also creating inequalities between rural and urban Tibetans. Ultimately, the historical inequalities that have been established between China and Tibet have allowed for the continued development of biases. China’s need for water as a resource, and the overuse of that resource within Tibet, has not only dismantled the environment, but also the social structure of a native population.
At this point, the ideological separation between Tibetans who still live within the region, and those who do not, has become drastic. It is often this dynamic that creates global misperceptions of the current social state of Tibet. Although there are tensions that remain, and even violence in some areas, the outsider perception of conflict in the region is often inaccurate compared to what currently impacts Tibetans. Therefore, in order to truly diminish the inequalities that do exist within Tibet, the rest of the world must realize a more accurate perception of the current social state of the region. Furthermore, as the development of modernization takes an increasingly large hold over the Plateau, Chinese policies must balance the benefits between those who favor urbanization versus those who wish to remain largely urban. Finally, as water continues to become an increasingly large issue for China, the allocation of such a resource must first be verified by local authorities to ultimately benefit not only national, but global priorities.
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