Environmental Dilemmas

Investigations by Lydia Bleifuss

  • A B O U T
  • T H E S I S
  • P R O J E C T S
    • Transboundary Watershed Comparative Study
    • Grand Canyon Escalade Proposal
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  • A R C H I V E
    • Waterkeeper Alliance Southwest Threats Assessment
    • Conflicts Over Surface Water Projects in Newly Industrialized Countries
    • Water’s Influence on Historical and Current Inequalities within Tibet
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    • Barriers to Energy Adoption in Portland
      • Qualitative Analysis
      • Statistical Analysis
    • Indonesia’s Environmental State
      • Environmental Analysis
      • Mapping Environmental Data
    • Technology and Environment
  • C O U R S E S

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Baker and Pascua

The HidroAsyén hydropower proposal,[1] backed by Endesa and Colbún, was officially denied in 2014. HidroAsyén would have included five separate hydro projects in Patagonia’s Pascua and Baker river basins and, based on internally generated estimations, produced 2,750 Megawatts (MW) of energy or 15-20% of total Chilean energy demand (HidroAysén 2011). While filed complaints targeted the predicted 14,000 acres of flooding, community relocations, deforestation, and the fragmentation of the rivers’ flows, the proposal faced intense and sustained social opposition on various fronts (Waterkeeper Alliance 2015). The plan’s rejection was a monumental action taken by the Chilean government, most notably displaying the power of opposition finances, international attention, and physical location.

Major financial assistance funneled through the Patagonia Sin Represas[2] (Patagonia Without Dams) campaign, backed by the Patagonia Defense Council (CDP), solidified momentum. The CDP is comprised of several people and organizations, including the National Resource Defense Council (NRDC) and Tompkins Conservation. Billboards and local radio announcements traversed Chile while documentaries, such as Patagonia Rising,[3] and social media voices spread internationally. The campaign hired people to document endangered species in the area, such as the Huemul, a Chilean deer. Lawyers were tasked with adding legal pressure to the approved EIA. Fierro believes that the already expensive infrastructure necessary to connect southern Patagonia to SIC, requiring 2,000 km of cabling, became too costly once local opponents threatened to sabotage the planned cabling and towers. Additionally, protests radiated as far north as Santiago. Peter Hartmann, director of Aisén Filial of the Comité Nacional Pro Defensa de La Fauna y Flora, explained in retrospect that the project denial “opened the door for many social movements and changed the political landscape in Chile” (Hartmann 2014, para. 14). Hartman goes on to emphasize that the HidroAsyén protests were the largest demonstrations in Chile in twenty years. This campaign was also greatly aided by Patagonia’s internationally renowned and charismatic landscape.

The essence of this multifaceted campaign’s success was the forced budget increases and prolonged development timeline. Gonzalez explains that Patagonia Sin Represas was able to “dela[y] the project a long time, which ma[de] it more expensive for the company to actually keep on working on it, so in the end it was too expensive because Endesa gets these loans and…investors begin to lose their investment.” This is a central point, emphasizing that project investors need to remain satisfied with the developments’ fiscal stability in order to continue funding it. Ultimately it was the project’s prolonged timeline, delayed by the previously described resistance strategies, which generated these financial issues. While the Baker and Pascua rivers remain largely under private control, and thus are always under threat of development, the HidroAsyén case redefined the hydropower resistance arena in Chile.  The movements success displayed not only the power of funded resistance strategies, but also the advantage international and trans-regional support.

[1] See (HidroAysén 2011) for HidroAysén’s official development plan and platform.

[2] See (PatagoniaSinRepresas 2014) for Patagonia Sin Represas’ campaign platform and resources.

[3] Brian Lilla’s Patagonia Rising documentary was released during the height of HidroAsyén resistance. For more information and trailers, reference (Patagonia Rising 2011).

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M E N U

  • ABSTRACT
    • PDF
    • Poster
  • INTRODUCTION
    • Hydropower Infrastructure and Impact
    • The Hydrosocial Cycle and Hydropower
    • Political Ecology of Neoliberal Management and Private Development
    • Political Ecology of Social Responses to River Development
  • CHILE
    • Hydropower Context
    • Developments
      • Bío Bío
      • Baker and Pascua
      • Futaleufú
      • Puelo
      • Maipo
    • Resistance Strategy Inferences
      • Small-Scale Development
      • Political Reform
      • Responsibility and Forward Momentum
  • BROADER IMPLICATIONS
  • Interviews
  • References
  • Running Posts
  • RESOURCES
    • Futaleufú Riverkeeper
    • Alto Maipo
    • No Alto Maipo
    • Kayak River Stewards of Chile