In this section I emphasize how basin management systems in which water is treated as a commodity disregard its fundamental role in ecological health, distort the balance of social power relations, and are predisposed to hydropower development. I establish this stance through the lens of political ecology as well as neoliberal platforms that inherently promote river development as it translates into economic benefit. Generally speaking, political ecology emphasizes the “premise that nature and environmental issues are inherently politicized and cannot be understood in isolation from the political and economic contexts within which they are produced” (Budds 2004, 5). These contexts, through which water management policies and regulations are formed, predetermine not only long-term ecological stability but also human interactions with water resources. Thus, political ecology illuminates how the roles of political and economic influences commanding hydropower have the ability to distance other necessary considerations from development decisions. More specifically, neoliberal strategies attach a market value to water,[1] or substantiate the commodification of a resource that has value beyond what an economic system can quantify. The regard, or lack there of, for “environmental consequences in [nations’] prescriptions for development,” or economic growth, is a concept that increases in complexity when considering the international private sector’s interactions with national water governance (Barbosa 2009, 28). This engagement relies upon the privatization of water, a concept that implies the creation of ownership, transforming for example, a water resource from a public good into a purchasable right.[2] “Privatization, therefore, is nothing else than a legally and institutionally condoned, if not encouraged, form of theft” (Swyngedouw 2005, 82). From a neoliberal perspective, market-based management is more efficient and effective, and “private sector involvement in water systems has been…a means of…increasing equity in terms of access to and affordability of water services” (Robinson 2013, 27). The realization of this ideal has been problematic however as hydropower industry interactions with water governance often serve as pertinent examples of misaligned allegiances and social conflict. Private energy corporations have not only developed an extensive international reach, they have also become powerful actors in both global markets and political systems.
Constructing a hydro project has come to imply the creation of a vast network of developers and financiers, often including multinational corporations. Such expansive involvement “underlines a shifting geopolitical situation, with an increasing number of projects financed by internationally operating companies based in foreign countries…general[ly], these parties only seize investment opportunities but are not involved in project development or dam operation” (Zarfl 2014, 168). An example of such a conglomeration is the Brazilian hydropower industry which in a two-year time span, 2010-2012, included financers from the United States, Spain, France, Switzerland, and twenty-eight other contributors (Zarfl 2014). These influences have historically and are currently bringing into question the legitimacy and overall national benefit of many developments, as profit margins from the energy produced are often directed towards foreign groups. The commodification of water, promoted through the neoliberal economic platform, has promoted such financial divisions, physically removing funders from the consequences of their investments. Considering hydropower, this dynamic continues to emphasize “the widespread acceptance of a global corporate ideology,” which “has played an important role in rationalizing and sanctifying unequal relations of power” (Campbell 2009, 77). Power dynamics are displayed through the increasingly prevalent social objections to hydro developers’ disregard for ramifications of altered flow regimes.
[1] For specific examples of applied neoliberal ideology, water privatization transitions, and results, please see (Robinson 2013).
[2] Refer to (Swyngedouw 2005) for examples of privatized water management systems, their transitions into becoming as such, and the subsequent increased potential for corrupt practices.