The Brahmaputra and Colorado River watersheds, already over allocated resources, are facing consequences of increasing environmental variability, while the managements of these basins have been deterred by lack of institutional and legal adaptation. Furthermore, they have displayed a history of permitting more politically powerful consumers, such as hydropower and agriculture, to heavily influence distribution. The ways in which the Colorado and Brahmaputra management systems choose to respond, especially in terms of growing allocation dilemmas both within and outside of their own boarders, will determine the future of these resources.
In general, political tensions are more often spurred by the creation of surface water projects with a simultaneous lack of institutional adaptation. The inability to respond to such change, even without various climate impacts, creates a platform for instability. In terms of the Colorado, the U.S. has been attempting to institutionally catchup to their alterations of the Colorado basin’s natural flow since the first major projects were put into place, such as the Hoover Dam. Although in relatively recent years such adaptations have been successful, the mistakes that were made along the way, especially in regards to Mexican water allocation and environmental impacts, will take a considerable amount of time to repair. Furthermore, in spite of the National Environmental Protection Act (1969), the Endangered Species Act (1973), and a general decreasing rate of dam building in the US, drought concerns may revitalize pressure to build reservoirs (Brown 2009).
In terms of the Brahmaputra, with many small and large-scale projects being planned or currently being constructed, “changes in the planning process for large dams [are] needed” (Brown 2009). Although in theory, any large dam built on the Brahmaputra must be approved by the basin commission, “it is not always feasible to provide… careful, multi-layered scrutiny” (Brown 2009). Furthermore, the development of smaller projects often proceeds unchecked. However, since 1996, China’s hydropower development has worked to create a more stable platform in regards to national dynamics, although international tensions have not been considered deeply (McNally 2009).
It is debatable whether the Colorado and Brahmaputra basin management systems can respond effectively and continuously to myriad of dilemmas such as fluctuating water supply, increasing flooding potential, environmental degradation, agricultural demands, and hydropower infrastructure. In order to “maintain a near-natural water transport through the landscape…our scope [of] the river channel…should include the entire catchment” (Nilsson 2005). Although both these water basin’s transport systems have already been substantially altered, considering all tributaries of the Colorado and Brahmaputra rivers, involving millions of resource users, remains vital. However, the complexity of management grows as “mutually acceptable solutions typically drop as more stakeholders are involved” (Wolf 2012). Both the Colorado and Brahmaputra must find ways to effectively respond to altered flows, as both domestic and international allocations become an increasingly dynamic and complex quandary.
Due to China’s rudimentary management decisions, largely based on the U.S.’s Prior Appropriation and Riparian doctrines, as well as other factors, the Brahmaputra is facing the dilemma of a static management system. Although adaptations have been slow to surface both within China and between neighboring nations, some rudimentary steps have been taken. In 2009, a data-sharing initiative was created, facilitated by the World Meteorological Organization and International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development, between Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, India, and Nepal. However, although India and China technically participate, they do not share their own hydrological data (Kibler 2014). Despite this unimpressive cooperation maneuver, more recent and impactful steps have been taken. For example, in 2013, the Republic of India’s Ministry of Water Resources and the People’s Republic of China’s Ministry of Water Resources made serious progress in terms of negotiating the exchange of hydrological information regarding the Brahmaputra, especially during flood season (Memorandum 2013). According to the agreement, India and China “recognized that trans-border rivers and related natural resources and the environment are assets of immense value to the socio-economic development of all riparian countries” (Memorandum 2013). By acknowledging the complexities behind the transboundary nature of the Brahmaputra, as well as its ecological value, China indicates potential for management adaptation. Although general management cooperation was also promised on both sides, and data sharing seems probable, concrete coordination agreements in terms of responding to environmental variability remain distant. Furthermore, although India has expressed its appreciation of upstream flood control, when drought becomes a more intrusive issue, it is unclear how allocation negotiations will ensue.
Drier climates have historically been more cooperative in terms of water management. Even though the increased glacial melt from the Himalayas is predicted to cause intensified flow for a time, long-term drought is a substantial concern (Stahl 2008). Furthermore, as a Newly Industrialized Country, China is facing the “stresses such as population growth, changing economic activity, land use change and urbanization, etc. which will increase water demand” (Stahl 2008). In addition to such stresses, “[i]t is and will continue to be tempting for upstream countries to take advantage of this only water source during the dry season” (Stahl 2008). Like the arid Western United States, Northern China already struggles “to meet [water] needs in arid areas experiencing growth…and has the potential to bring any water management decision to a standstill as water interests exert their political and legal power” (Wolf 2012).
Largely due to a history of unadaptive policies, a “general pattern exists across the West[ern] [U.S.] whereby senior water right holders established rights to the point of complete, if not over-appropriation of the resource” (Wolf 2012). Such a permanent set of allocation divisions creates an incredibly static system, and a less likely adaptor to external pressures, such as environmental fluctuations. In combination with such rigid allocation decisions, the U.S. has experienced difficult dynamics in regards to arid land management, especially regarding agriculture, and is now attempting to mitigate the consequences of such an unresponsive and inflexible system. However, such adaptiveness is challenging to implement when the West continues to be the most rapidly growing, and driest part of the U.S., much like Northern China (Wolf 2012). In addition to increasingly arid conditions, partially created by over allocation, climate variability has spurred earlier annual snowpack melts (which contribute the majority of the Colorado Basin’s water), which creates a demand for different catchment strategies to prolong the flow over the normal season.
Despite such challenges, major efforts to remedy growing issues have been put into place, especially regarding cooperative relations between the U.S. and Mexico. “The United States and Mexico have developed a solid framework to manage transboundary surface and groundwater resources and associated conflicts over the past 100 years. Each dispute in this long history of conflicts or disagreements provides the foundation for resolving similar disputes in the future. As demonstrated by the passage of Minutes, cooperation between the United States and Mexico changes and adapts to new issues” (Neir 2007). The Minute agreements have indeed made a profound difference regarding water allocation to Mexico. Minute 242, for example, made it clear that in order to “avoid future problems, the United States and Mexico shall consult with each other prior to undertaking any new development of either the surface [water] or the groundwater resources, or undertaking substantial modifications of present developments, in its own territory in the border area that might adversely affect the other country” (International Boundary and Water Commission 1973). Since that time, the U.S. and Mexico have moved beyond the basic concepts of transboundary cooperation and open communication, and have most recently agreed to Minute 319.
In this agreement, both the US and Mexico identify the “potential future increased variability due to climate change; therefore, proactive management of the Colorado River will maximize utilization of the resource during variable reservoir conditions, benefiting both countries” (International Boundary and Water Commission 2012). In combination with this statement, the US and Mexico made specifically defined water allocations for Mexico depending of reservoir levels, in addition to substantial moves towards restoring the Colorado River Delta in Mexico. This restoration project mainly involves the release of “pulse flows” from U.S.’s Colorado storage, which will benefit the riparian ecosystem of the Delta. In addition to this project, new cooperative initiatives regarding the All-American Canal and other past project are underway. Although such progress still “wrestles with its century-old laws which were made with different societal goals in mind,” management of the Colorado has come a long way (Wolf 2012). The Colorado is “vulnerable to the occurrence of extreme events such as droughts,” however these and other recently enacted policies and specific allocations to Mexico may help mitigate any future potential political instability (Stahl 2008).
Treaty formulation, especially multilateral, has been vague and “past agreements likely did not consider enhanced effects due to climate change and hence the treaties are at risk to fail as they may have underestimated potential severity of events” (Stahl 2008). Although Colorado Basin management has more deeply considered such environmental consequences, and has created more specific agreements due to water flow variability, China lacks such specificity with India or any other country. China has historically handled international water negotiations bilaterally, where as a transboundary basin, such as the Brahmaputra, involves more than two countries. Furthermore, “cooperation is demonstrated by the voluntary use of the institutional entities available to each country such that effective management of transboundary water resources is accomplished” (Neir 2007). When China develops more of a voluntary interest in sharing relevant data multilaterally, major cooperation could ensue. Like the U.S. and Mexico, China’s incentive to maintain good relations with India, another major Newly Industrialized Country, appears to be far greater than the probability of legitimate conflict. Whether China will be willing to enter a specific and adaptive water compact, undertaking environmental concerns, with more than one country is debatable. The question seems to be whether or not China will adapt early enough to avoid similar over allocation and transboundary tensions that the U.S. has been attempting to repair.
W O R K S C I T E D
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